



**MARINE CORPS  
GAZETTE**



# Marine Corps Gazette

FEBRUARY 1951

## CONTENTS

MESSAGE CENTER	2
CHOSIN RESERVOIR TO HUNGNAME	14
LANDING TECHNIQUES—A LOOK TO THE FUTURE <i>By LtCol Lewis W. Walt</i>	20
AVIATORS SHOULD FLY <i>By Capt Lynn W. Griffits</i>	28
LEADERS OF WORLD COMMUNISM <i>By SqdrnLdr John Gellner, RCAF</i>	30
ADVICE FOR THE REPLACEMENT PILOT <i>By Capt. W. F. Simpson</i>	40
SMOKE MEANS SURVIVAL <i>By Maj Robert E. Collier</i>	42
THE FEDERALS AND FORT FISHER, PART II <i>By Maj Edwin H. Simmons</i>	46
IN BRIEF	54
100 BEST BOOKS FOR A MILITARY EDUCATION <i>By LtCol Robert B. McRae, USA</i>	56
PASSING IN REVIEW	62
HOW WOULD YOU DO IT? <i>By 2ndLt Charles R. Stiles</i>	III Cover
ANABASIS IN NORTH KOREA <i>By C. W. Dressler</i>	IV Cover

**Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor that of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.**

**THIS MONTH'S COVER:** Marines file down a mountain road from the Korean town of Koto-ri. In the long withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir area to Hungnam, where they were evacuated, the men of the 1st Marine Division fought not only the Chinese Communists but below-zero temperatures as well. For more pictures turn to page 14. Also see *The Anabasis in North Korea* on the back cover of this issue.

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## MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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**THIS MONTH AND NEXT** — To those who argue that the atomic bomb and other new weapons have invalidated many of the principles of amphibious warfare, LtCol Lewis W. Walt's *Landing Techniques—A Look to the Future*, on page 20, should provide food for considerable thought.

Much is said these days in the papers and periodicals about Communism, but little about the people who actually make Communism in government work. SqdrnLdr John Gellner, in his article *Leaders of World Communism* (page 30) discusses the better known and more important Communists, both in the USSR and her satellites, their backgrounds, and how they fit into the Soviet scheme of things.

Marine pilots who are ordered overseas will get some ideas from *Advice for the Replacement Pilot*, by Capt W. F. Simpson, written from experiences gained in Korea. Included are many points on which outbound pilots should refresh themselves.

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TO THE EDITOR

# Message Center

## Wills . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have wondered why the Corps doesn't adopt a simplified form (perhaps to be inserted in record book) that can be executed as a legal will. Marine Corps Memorandum 86-49 emphasized the need of wills but referred personnel to their legal officers. During the last war, while overseas, just as a matter of curiosity, I asked Marine officers and enlisted, married and single, if they had executed a will; 99 per cent of those I asked stated they had not!

Present beneficiary slips provide for any *service benefits* accruing to next of kin, but what of real estate holdings, bank balances, trusts, bonds, etc., that can be settled only by wills without having recourse to legal red tape and entanglement?

Perhaps in line with unification, a Department of Defense will applicable to all armed services could be instituted. The need for this type of form is more apparent than ever considering current world affairs — at best, even in peace time, a serviceman's profession is, on the whole, more dangerous than that of the average civilian, and preparation of a properly executed will would obviate many unnecessary delays in settlement of estates.

E. A. LA ROCQUE,  
MSgt, USMC

ED: The GAZETTE checked with the Quantico legal office with regard to the feasibility of having a standard will. While the legal office has on hand standard forms that will fit many cases, it recommends that each person ex-

## RECENT KOREA AWARDS

### Legion of Merit:

Col Deane C. Roberts and LtCol Ranson M. Wood.

### Silver Star:

BrigGen Edward A. Craig, LtCol Raymond L. Murray, Col Lewis B. Puller, 2dLt Hugh C. Schryver, Jr., LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., MajGen Oliver P. Smith, LtCol Robert D. Taplett, and MSgt Leonard R. Young.

### Bronze Star:

2dLt Dana B. Cashion, SSgt Edwin Madejczyk, and 2dLt Philip D. Shutler.

### Distinguished Flying Cross:

LtCol Norman J. Anderson, 2dLt Aquilla M. Blaydes, 1stLt John Browne, 1stLt Forrest E. Caudle, 2dLt Doyle H. Cole, Capt Donald Conroy, Capt Oliver W. Curtis, 1stLt Sidney Fisher, Capt Howard Ferguson, Jr., Capt Robert J. Graham, 1stLt John L. Greene, Capt William J. Halligan, Capt Charles A. House, TSgt Leo J. Ihli, Capt James K. Johnson, Maj Robert E. Johnson, 1stLt Tracy N. Johnson, Capt John P. Kelley, Capt William J. Longfellow, Maj Arnold A. Lund, Maj William M. Lundin, 1stLt Jerry L. McCollom, MSgt Robert J. Mossman, TSgt Hugh F. Newell, Capt Warren P. Nichols, Capt Lloyd S. Penn, Capt John S. Perrin, Maj Kenneth L. Reusser, Capt John D. Ross, MSgt Donald E. Rupe, Capt Henry H. Schwendimann, 1stLt Eldon C. Stanton, TSgt

Irving G. Taylor, TSgt George J. Welker, 1stLt Joseph L. Wosser, Jr., and Capt Theodore R. Yachik.

### Air Medal:

LtCol Norman J. Anderson (10th), Capt Bryon H. Beswick (1st and 2d), 2dLt Aquilla M. Blaydes (6th), 1stLt John Browne (3d), TSgt Truman G. Bunce (2d), 1stLt Forrest E. Caudle (3d), 2dLt Doyle H. Cole (3d), 1stLt Frank S. Crawford (2d), Capt Oliver W. Curtis (8th), 1stLt George H. Dodenhoff (2d), 1stLt James C. Dunphy (4th), Capt Howard Ferguson, Jr. (7th), Capt Don H. Fisher (2d and 3d), 1stLt Sidney Fisher (3d), TSgt Martin I. Frederick, Jr. (3d), Capt Don W. Galbreath (1st), Capt Robert J. Graham (3d), 1stLt John L. Greene (3d), 1stLt William L. Hall (8th), Capt William J. Halligan (3d), Capt Roland B. Heilman (13th), Capt Charles A. House (3d), TSgt Leo J. Ihli (3d), Capt James K. Johnson (7th), Maj Robert E. Johnson (3d), 1stLt Tracy N. Johnson (3d), 1stLt Elwin M. Jones (2d and 3d), Capt John P. Kelley (8th), Maj Arnold A. Lund (10th), Capt Emmons S. Maloney (1st), 1stLt Jerry L. McCollom (3d), 1stLt Robert W. Minick (3d), MSgt Robert J. Mossman (3d), TSgt Hugh F. Newell (5th), Capt Warren P. Nichols (15th), 2dLt Stanley J. Osserman (3d), 1stLt Eugene M. Oster (2d), 1stLt Richard H. Peacock (1st), Capt Lloyd S. Penn (3d), Maj Kenneth L. Reusser (6th), TSgt Richard T. Rodd, Jr. (3d), Capt John D. Ross (9th), MSgt Donald E. Rupe (3d), Capt Henry N. Schwendimann (4th), Capt Jerry B. Smith (6th), 1stLt Eldon C. Stanton (4th), TSgt Irving G. Taylor (3d), Capt Forrest "I" Townsend (3d), 1stLt Hiel L. Van Campen (2d and 3d), Capt Ralph P. Ward, Jr. (2d), TSgt George J. Welker (3d), 1stLt Robert N. Welch (7th), and Capt Theodore R. Yachik (3d).

(Continued on page 45)

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ecuting a will obtain legal advice, because wills and their probate are much more complicated than most people think. A proper type will is required to meet individual circumstances and to comply with probate procedures which vary from state to state. Unless the will is executed properly it may be practically useless.

**Correction . . .**

DEAR SIR:

I have been reading the GAZETTE since 1942 and think that the November issue is one of the finest. I have one small point. In the November issue on page 81 you said "Although elements of the 3d Marine Raider Battalion made the initial landing (at Segi Point, 21 June 1943)." I was with the 4th Raiders and its O, P, and Headquarters Company of the 4th Marine Raider Battalion which landed on Segi Point 20 June 1943. It may have been 21 June 1943. It's been a long time. Just wanted to clear up which.

J. J. REILLY,  
Cpl, USMC

ED: You are right on the unit being the 4th Marine Raider Battalion rather than the 3d. The date—21 June 1943—is correct.

**Letter from New Zealand . . .**

DEAR SIR:


I noticed in a late issue of *Time* magazine that you will be printing the 175th anniversary issue of the Marine Corps GAZETTE in a few weeks. I wonder if you could oblige me by sending details of the issue and if you would take a civilian's subscription to the GAZETTE.

During the war when the U. S. Marines were stationed in New Zealand, a couple of copies of the GAZETTE were handed to me by a Marine and I can tell you that I never put them down until I had read them thoroughly. I am very interested in the history and doing of Marines of all countries and at the moment am gathering facts and information to write a short unofficial history and a couple of novels about the Royal Marines.

Before I finish this letter I would like to ask if you know of any bookshop in the States that deals in USMC doings, deeds and history.

F. J. ROSCOE  
Auckland, N. Z.

ED: Under separate cover we are sending you the information requested concerning the November GAZETTE. There are no restrictions on who may subscribe to the GAZETTE. Membership in the Marine Corps Association, however, is limited to members of the U. S. Armed Services or honorably discharged former members of the Armed Forces. The GAZETTE Bookshop will be glad to secure for you any book in print that deals with Marines, Marine history, or Marine battles. You will soon receive a list of appropriate titles.



## The Bridge That Flew To Korea...Overnight!

All bridges across the Han River had been destroyed by retreating North Korean Communist armies, holding up the United Nations advance. We needed to bridge the Han in a hurry.

Back in Japan, U. N. troops prepared a 256-ton, 600-foot pontoon bridge—in sections—to fit into the U.S.A.F. Combat Cargo Command's Fairchild C-119's. Piece by piece, plane by plane, they flew

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### Circulation Breakdown . . .

DEAR SIR:

As a cover to cover reader of the Marine Corps GAZETTE, I am curious and interested in seeing a breakdown of the GAZETTE's circulation since frequent contributions from military authors of friendly foreign nations, as well as from our sister services, appear between the GAZETTE's covers.

Therefore, I would like to see a breakdown of the foreign, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and ex-Marine circulation included in a future issue. I am sure that many other readers share this curiosity and interest.

MARION W. MORRISSET,  
1st Lt, USMC

ED: To fulfill your request the GAZETTE would have to turn its entire staff to for several weeks. However, we do have some figures and general information which may be of interest to you.

During the six-month period from July-December 1950 the GAZETTE's circulation increased approximately 55%. The GAZETTE circulates by paid subscription in all 48 states, all U. S. territories, and in 29 foreign countries. The GAZETTE also goes to every major executive branch of the federal government, to many Senators and Congressmen, to all major installations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Regular Marines of all ranks naturally comprise the greater part of our circulation. However, the number of Reserves and civilians who subscribe amounts to almost one-third of our circulation.

We know there are far more readers of the GAZETTE than there are subscribers because we get many letters and some articles from persons who are not on our subscription list.

Below is our latest sworn circulation statement:

Individual Subscription	16,426
Bulk paid distribution to units	7,697
Single Copy sales	461
<hr/>	
Total Net Paid	24,584
Advertisers and agencies	200
Other Unpaid (Exchange and publicity)	200
Total	24,984

### More On College . . .

DEAR SIR:

I do not agree that the Marine Corps should send its non-college officers to college at government expense. (ED: See the article *Lets Go To College*, by 2d Lt Charles D. Stiles in the October GAZETTE.) The cost of such a program and the loss of services of the personnel concerned would greatly offset any advantages which might accrue from it.

From my limited experience in the Marine Corps, I have concluded that the non-college officers are as well qualified for




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their rank as any group and do not suffer because they were not fortunate enough to attend college before entering the Marine Corps.

It is my belief that most of the officer's schools requiring college background that were referred to, do so by the very nature of their curriculum and not to discriminate against any officers.

Perhaps if a young officer is desirous of attending one of these schools later in his career, he could attain his objective by attending night school under the new program mentioned in the *In Brief* section of the January GAZETTE.

WILLIAM F. WAGNER,  
1stLt, USMC

**Leader ...**

DEAR SIR:

The advent of mobilization brings me some bitter memories, so I offer these observations for what they may be worth.

Volumes have been written about military discipline, and all of the points must have already been covered, but it does no harm to write an occasional resume for the benefit of those who are just commencing their military service and as a sort of refresher for those who are prone to take these fundamental doctrines for granted.

All too often, the worst offenders are the persons to whom the exercise of its basic tenets should be as natural as the bodily function of breathing.

Too often, and often unknown to their very selves, they become infected with the insidious "fads" and experiments to make our armed forces "democratic."

Military courtesy and discipline are so closely interwoven that they are almost impossible to distinguish, and herein I shall treat them as synonymous.

Junior officers are the worst offenders. Of necessity, little time is spent on this important subject as he is indoctrinated with the technical aspects of his training, and invariably it must come as a surprise that the "units" (be they single persons or whole regiments) with which he worked on paper, at school, are human beings the same as himself, and all too often are more to be pitied than censured for the petty infractions of regulations which need travel no further than himself for corrective measures.

Now for some do's and don'ts; for the new lieutenant, whom we shall say is a platoon leader. It is a terrific burden for one so young. He must have the wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job, but his task will be easy if he follows the simple rules laid down by hundreds of generations of professional soldiers and does not attempt to "write his own book."

To begin with, familiarity breeds contempt, and if you attempt to gain the confidence of your men by "sharing" personal experiences and family background with them you are going to find it mighty tough when the time comes for you to give them a distasteful order. One day they will be calling

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you a "regular guy," and the next day the names that they call you will not be fit to print. You will have to revert to the role of "tyrant" to get anything accomplished. What a contrast to the man who has learned the problems of his men without asking them to share the burden of his own!

A fine illustration of this was the Russian army in Finland, in 1939. It proved beyond doubt that an army without military discipline was nothing but a mob. Privates, they tell me, called their officers "comrade," and political affluence hindered the officers in the performance of their duties in the persons of "commissars." The inevitable results of the set-backs that the Russians suffered was an exaggerated form of military discipline so severe that it literally had the privates saluting the corporals.

Don't call an enlisted man by his first name or by his nickname. Privates and PFCs are addressed by their surname. Address NCO's by their surname, preceded by their rank. Don't chew the cocky private out, who has just called you "Joe," or "Mac," because he has heard another enlisted man

get away with it — get his sergeant to put a stop to it. Such things just don't happen unless you have done something to encourage it.

Don't ever drink to be "one of the boys." Have a couple of brews at the beer-bust, but don't get "sloppy." Taste the raisin-jack, if you wish, but promise to punish the man who gets drunk on it, and keep your promise. Make it a habit to be the one who pays, whenever you drink with enlisted persons and you will soon find the novelty wearing off. Never drink standing at a public bar.

Learn to distinguish between the petty and the serious, so that you may dispense justice without burdening higher echelons with any unnecessary administrations. The pilfering of a package of cigarettes to the soldier in the front lines is often more serious (to him) than the loss of a twenty-dollar bill to the man on barracks duty.

Above all, there can be no favorites. You must be impartial.

I have always been opposed to "double jeopardy," wherein the sadistic corporal threatens to run some man up, if the

**Representative of the Marine Corps' versatility on land, sea, and in the air, the detachment of Marines at the Miami (Fla.) Naval Air Station prepared this float for the 1950-51 King Orange Jamboree parade. Landing craft in center of float was mounted on rockers to simulate wave motion as the float progressed down Miami's famed Biscayne Boulevard and Flager Street before more than 300,000 spectators. Note model Banshee plane at rear.**



ON LAND OR SEA —  
KEEP THE SITUATION  
WELL IN HAND!



Take a break!  
Get a Lift!  
Get that PEPSI  
Bounce!




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private does not take *his* peculiar punishment. EPD and restriction are the perogatives of the CO and him alone; however, a satisfactory "understanding" can be reached by going no higher than the junior officer—but let it go no lower. That is the way you get your *experience* as an officer. Consider the advice of your sergeants, and especially your first sergeant, but don't leave company punishment in his hands, regardless of how efficient he may be. There is no quicker way to lose control of your unit and to earn the disrespect of your men.

Just one more thing, in closing. How shall you know when you have succeeded, and have earned the title of "leader"? When one day it comes upon you, with a shock, that you are "lonesome," you will know that you have attained your goal. That is the price of true leadership and the most trying moment of all. You will be tempted to do everything from call in your platoon sergeant for a game of cribbage and a bottle of beer to an out-and-out "bull session" with the second squad. It is a good, normal, and healthy emotion, but if you cannot dissipate it through association with your fellow officers, or circumstances forbid a visit to your home and family, then put your feelings down on paper and send the letter home.

JOHN J. MORGAN,  
MSgt, USMC

### Term Insurance Cash Value . . .

DEAR SIR:


In regard to the letter in Message Center of the December GAZETTE concerning NSLI hidden benefits, allow me to pass on the following information concerning cash value with reference to term insurance, which was furnished by a Veterans Administration regional insurance officer.

Term insurance has no cash value. However, at times it has a slight cash reserve. This cash reserve is never available to the insured except on retroactive conversion. The amount is small and if any such reserve is available, the District Office will utilize it in effecting conversion.

PETER P. BUTZ,  
MSgt, USMC

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

## Alive today



*...because, five years ago, he went to his doctor when he first noticed one of cancer's danger signals.*

Do you know the seven common danger signals that *may* mean cancer: (1) any sore that does not heal (2) a lump or thickening, in the breast or elsewhere (3) unusual bleeding or discharge (4) any change in a wart or mole (5) persistent indigestion or difficulty in swallowing (6) persistent hoarseness or cough (7) any change in normal bowel habits.

By showing Americans what they can do to protect themselves and their families against cancer, the

American Cancer Society is saving thousands of lives *today*. By supporting science and medicine in the search for the causes and cures of cancer, the Society hopes to save countless more *tomorrow*. Your best insurance against cancer:—Make a habit of having regular periodic physical check-ups no matter how well you may *feel*. Learn the basic facts about cancer . . . Telephone the American Cancer Society office nearest you or address your letter to "Cancer" in care of your local Post Office.

**American Cancer Society**





LEFT: After standing off attacks by three Chinese Communist divisions, the 1st Marine Division starts its withdrawal. In five days and nights of freezing temperatures, the division fought back 15 miles to Hagaru-ri, where it reorganized for its 40-mile trip down mountain trails to the sea and evacuation. BELOW LEFT: A quickly organized firing line takes position in the snow along main road. LOWER RIGHT: Rest stop in blinding snow after moving out of Kodari. RIGHT: Supplies are dropped during reorganization at Yudam-ni. While here, the Marines saw the temperature drop to 25 degrees below zero. Water cans froze solid. BELOW: Withdrawing Marines follow twisting mountain trail, bringing their equipment out with them. Icy winds and bitter cold took their toll. Patrols ahead searched for Chinese Communist forces waiting in ambush.





ABOVE: Tanks are assembled in snowy tank park after the move from Kodari. Intense cold made ordinary maintenance difficult. LEFT: Temporary camp is set up by unit after returning from patrol near Kodari. Pyramidal tents (right background) offered protection from bite of icy wind.

RIGHT: Chinese Communist prisoners are marched to the rear past Marine infantry and tanks. Note attention of Marines to action farther up road.  
BELOW: Tanks and heavy weapons are placed astride road in defensive positions in vicinity of Koto-ri.





Through with their part in the fight, these Chinese Communist prisoners are huddled in protection of cliff face prior to being sent to the rear. Note their heavy padded winter clothing and caps.

Covered with blankets, the wounded lie near shelter of destroyed Korean house. Those with minor wounds are able to sit on porch. Men in foreground are litter cases.



# Landing Techniques — A Look To The Future

By LtCol Lewis W. Walt

★ FIVE YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE MARINE CORPS fought its last World War II battle on Okinawa. During this period the Marine Corps has continually maintained fighting forces in readiness and through organization and training has tried to capitalize on those lessons learned in World War II.

The effectiveness of these efforts has been proven by the promptness and proficiency with which the Marines have entered into and performed in the Korean War.

Preparedness has been the outstanding characteristic of the Marine Corps throughout its existence and is the watchword of every Marine today as it was a hundred years ago. Preparedness covers a multiple of factors. To the Marine Corps, preparedness means all of those things which are of concern to the readiness of its integral units but it also means looking ahead to future trends and developments. It means constant effort on developing and testing of new equipment, new weapons, and new techniques. It means keeping a wary eye on the world situation in an attempt to keep the Corps' fighting units best prepared for combat in those areas where conflict is likely to take place. This last factor of preparedness paid great dividends in World War II. When the Pacific campaign began in 1941, the Marine Corps was the only military force prepared to launch amphibious attacks. These attacks proved to be disastrous to the Japanese forces and were the only means available to the Allied forces for seizing enemy-held territory.

To the American public the Marine Corps is a force in readiness prepared at all times for an emergency. In his address at the United States Naval Academy on 2 December 1949, Adm Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, stated: "The outstanding characteristic of the Marine Corps will always be, as it is today and always

has been—readiness. Readiness to go anywhere, at any time, to do the job. In the Marines, the Nation truly has a force in constant readiness."

As compared in size to other armed forces of the world, the Fleet Marine Force (approximately five per cent of total of U. S. Armed Services) is a very small and relatively insignificant number of men. Its strength then lies not in numbers but in its alertness and constant effectiveness which in turn is in direct proportion to its preparedness.

★ SINCE THE MARINE CORPS is an integral part of the Naval service, the primary mission of the FMF is amphibious. It must be an organization trained at all times to attack and to fight from the sea. Therefore, the Corps' main effort in preparedness must be directed toward further development of amphibious operations in order to maintain the highest degree of readiness in its Fleet Marine Forces.


Prior to discussing possibilities of amphibious operations in the future, let us take a brief look at the strength and weakness of an amphibious operation.

The present day amphibious force has certain inherent characteristics which make it superior, in many respects, to all other types of fighting forces in being today. For this reason it will continue to be one of the most potent weapons available to this country for use against any future enemy. There is no other force or combination of forces in our entire Department of Defense which has the potentialities of a fully organized and trained amphibious attack force. It has strategic and tactical mobility which makes it a weapon of secrecy and surprise. By using only those forces organic to it, it can seize and defend a portion of an enemy shore, together with air and sea areas adjacent thereto. An amphibious attack force is





Today's amphibious force has certain inherent characteristics which make it superior, in many respects, to all other types of fighting forces now in existence. Because of new weapons and defensive tactics, however, certain phases of the amphibious attack must be changed. Chief among these is the vulnerable ship-to-shore phase




capable of independent and sustained action against strong enemy forces. It has a freedom of action on its supply lines and enjoys the advantage of being able to continually resupply and reinforce from distant rear areas. The balanced amphibious force is totally independent of other forces to either support or protect it. It is a fighting team made up of surface, subsurface, air and landing forces. Each element is a part of the team and supported by every other member of the team. The landing force element not only has all the organic weapons normally available to a conventional infantry unit but its potential is increased immeasurably by the close support of carrier aircraft and naval guns. The fact that any of our potential enemies of today may be without strong naval surface forces only tends to increase the potency of our amphibious forces and gives our nation a mobile striking force second to none. Adm Radford in his speech at Chautauqua, N. Y., 10 July 1948, summed up many advantages of an amphibious attack force when he stated, "Sea power permits the multiple use of the same force. A small army in effect becomes many armies. Mobility on the seas almost magically increases the offensive power of a given group."

On our debit side of the ledger for an amphibious attack force is the critical and vulnerable ship-to-shore phase. The fact that the landing force must be transferred piecemeal from the ships to the beach and then depend on their supplies arriving over the same route, makes this phase by far the most hazardous link of the amphibious operation. The advent of new weapons and defensive techniques makes this phase even more susceptible to enemy action.

Since the beginning of history, armament has influenced the tactics and technique of warfare. New weapons

have forced the adoption of new tactics and new techniques. Although fundamental tactical doctrines may not have changed since the beginning of warfare, still the methods used to carry out these doctrines have changed, and in each instance this change has been brought about by the introduction of new and improved weapons. Certainly no period in the history of mankind has developed more new and improved weapons than has the past decade. These weapons, ranging from the bazooka to the atomic bomb, exerted a great influence on the outcome of World War II. The enemy was not prepared for these new weapons and was not allowed time to change his tactics to counteract them. In the next conflict the enemy will have these weapons at his disposal and unless we make certain changes in our technique and tactical employment our forces will be as vulnerable in the face of such weapons as was our enemy in World War II. Again quoting the Chief of Naval Operations: "Amphibious operations will continue to play an important part in the Navy of the future. Tactics and techniques will change and equipment will be improved. The availability of weapons of mass destruction, such as the atomic bomb, will exert a profound influence, but they will not change the fundamental necessity in war for moving men and material into overseas positions. They will not reduce the benefits that the control of the sea brings in permitting selection of time and place of attack while forcing on the enemy overwhelming defensive commitments. We may expect a highly coordinated and highly flexible use of both airborne and amphibious elements. We must develop speed in preparation, speed in the movement to the objective, and *speed in getting the troops and supplies ashore and dispersed*. Heavy concentrations on the shore line will have to be avoided by speed and dispersal, by the



Future amphibious operations must be characterized by speed and dispersal. The helicopter and transpor

use of separated attack points and by greater use of preliminary infiltrations."

The Marine Corps has been given the responsibility of developing these phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique and equipment employed by landing forces. There has been very little change in the technique used in a landing operation since its original development in the Fleet Marine Force. It is true that the types of landing craft have changed; much more extensive and effective use is made of naval gunfire and tactical air support; landing ships have been developed and the shore party has come into being. However, these can be classed as improvements and expedients which supplement the original version of the ship-to-shore technique. An amphibious force still has the transport area in which the personnel transports and cargo ships are congregated (only a few hundred yards apart) from five to fifteen thousand yards off the landing beach. It still practices the procedure of loading assault personnel, weapons and equipment into small assault landing craft (LCVP, LCM and LVT) and sending them over long distances to the landing beach, during which time they are wholly at the mercy of the beach defenders except for the cover of supporting fires from ships and aircraft. The initial assault landings are still a slow, painfully deliberate and vulnerable operation. The success of the operation relies entirely on the ability of supporting arms to neutralize the enemy sufficiently to allow the landing force to get a toe-hold on the beach. Then it depends on the ability of a thin line of infantry, given all help possible from supporting arms, to fight its way to the top of the high ground overlooking the landing beach, in the face of everything a desperate enemy, with the advantages of terrain and observation, can throw at them.

This ship-to-shore landing technique and the subse-


quent uphill fight to the beachhead line is obsolescent in light of modern developments. It is likely that such an attack would prove disastrous if launched against our potential enemy of today. With the latest weapons (guided missiles, proximity fuses, atomic warheads, etc.) at his disposal, the whole landing attempt could well be a suicidal mission from the time the ships were assembled in the transport area. Associate Professor E. B. Potter, U. S. Naval Academy, stated in a speech at Norfolk, Va., in December, 1949, "The first, and perhaps the main, lesson in tactics to be learned from history is the obvious one that we must adapt our tactics to new weapons—and do it quickly and intelligently. We must, in short, avoid 'fighting the last war.' "

The problem is one of tactics and technique to be used in the assault landing operation. The present procedure, although possibly still effective against lightly defended areas of a weak enemy, is outmoded for an assault landing on a beach defended by a strong enemy. The time is past when assault infantry can be placed as helpless victims aboard slow-moving landing craft, several miles from the shore, and expect that a sufficient number of them will reach a defended beach to initiate an attack. No matter how well a Marine may be trained or armed, when in the role of a passenger aboard a landing craft, he is totally incapable of retaliation against any type of enemy action. The time is past when the Navy can assemble and anchor even a small number of vessels within sight of the landing area with any degree of safety. It was done in the last war against an inferior and often stupid enemy. Even then, it proved to be a costly maneuver in the latter part of both the European and Pacific Wars.

One obvious means of attaining protection against these new weapons is by practicing dispersion and distance. Dispersion of the landing craft moving from ship-



planes are armored to land or drop troops quickly on scattered targets by surprise from the air.



These planes provide the commander with excellent opportunities which takes advantage of surprise element.


to-shore and of the large vessels within the transport area, and *distance* between the transport area and the landing beach. This could be readily accomplished by the Navy except for one limiting factor. The landing craft used to transport the assault forces from the transport to the beach have definite limitations as to seaworthiness, speed and range of action. Other obstacles are encountered: seasickness of troops who have been aboard a small boat for a long period of time; the control of greatly dispersed landing craft during movement to the beach and such craft, so dispersed, even if controlled, would deliver assault troops on the beach in such widely scattered formations that control and coordinated attacks would be impossible. This would afford our enemy the coveted opportunity of defeating us in detail and would only insure complete failure of the operation.

• **WHAT THEN IS THE ANSWER** to this question? It is evident that much greater dispersion is mandatory during the assault phase of an amphibious operation. For that reason the technique of the ship-to-shore movement must be altered to accomplish this dispersion in such a manner as to not weaken or cripple the landing effort. In the last war, the dispersion of the naval vessels was stretched to the maximum of the capabilities of the landing craft. In some operations the assault troops were forced to be in landing craft for as long as three hours, in order to land on schedule. Such practices, due to cramped positions and seasickness, cut the efficiency of the fighting man by at least 50 per cent at a time when his utmost efficiency is vital to the success of the operation. The landing craft of today are unsuitable for the landing of the initial assault forces from greatly dispersed transport vessels against a defended beach due to their slow rate of speed, their vulnerability and their unseaworthiness in open sea. Either we must have some means that is faster, less demoralizing, less vulnerable, and a great deal more maneuverable to land initial assault forces, or else we must have transport vessels capable of delivering assault troops closer to the landing beach with more finesse.

There are no troop transports under development today which fulfill all these requirements. The helicopter is considered to have great potentialities from the viewpoint of the landing force. According to the most competent authorities, it will be only a few years until a helicopter will be developed which will be capable of carrying 25-30 fully-equipped Marines or a comparable load of weapons, rations and equipment. With helicopters of this

capacity it is quite reasonable to expect that the assault waves of a division could be landed by helicopter not on the beach, which has become the focal point of all the enemy defensive fires, but on the high ground overlooking the beach area. From this advantageous position the assault waves would enjoy the full benefit of the key terrain features, especially observation, and would have the advantage of being able to attack the enemy beach defenses from the rear.

It is possible that the transport submarine may be developed to a point where it will be a practical means of transporting assault troops for an amphibious attack. Certainly such a means of transport would add a great deal to the element of secrecy and surprise which is already a characteristic of the amphibious attack. If the submarine transport were developed to carry an assault force the size of a fully-equipped rifle company it would be an effective means of landing troops to execute a reconnaissance in force or to establish a small beachhead to facilitate landing of heavier supporting units. It is evident that this means of transport would have definite limitations. It is slow and would require that troops be billeted in cramped quarters for long periods of time just prior to their commitment, which probably would decrease the combat efficiency of the unit. We would still be faced with the problem of moving the troops from the submarine to the beach. The rubber boat is one means of executing the submarine-to-shore movement but it is a tedious and hazardous operation. It is excellent for secrecy and surprise but it is a most impractical means of moving large numbers of troops or any appreciable amount of equipment or supplies, particularly at night when it is likely this operation would take place. The final and probably the most serious limitation of the transport submarine is its small cargo carrying capability. It means that the troops, so transported, must be very lightly equipped and that they must land with a very minimum of supplies. All equipment and supplies would of necessity have to be hand transportable because of both the submarine limitations and means available to transport them to the shore. The heaviest weapon which could be carried by a BLT would be the 81mm mortar and then only with a limited amount of ammunition. A portion of this deficiency would be counteracted by the availability of close air support and naval gunfire support but the lack of tanks and artillery would still prove to be a critical deficiency to the submarine transported landing force.



Another possible solution to the ship-to-shore phase would be to develop a fast surface transport capable of discharging fully loaded small fast boats close ashore while under way. Such operation would be performed under cover of darkness or under cover of a smoke screen. In either case, each of the small boats, carrying approximately 25 fully-equipped Marines or an equivalent amount of cargo or equipment, should be equipped with a small navigation device to insure its ability to arrive at a designated point on the landing beach at the specified time. A landing force so transported might well augment the helicopter-landed forces in the assault landing.


A third possibility in the development of the amphibious attack force technique might be the use of personnel transport planes off Navy aircraft carriers. If a small transport plane with capacity of 25 fully equipped Marine paratroopers or an equivalent load of air transportable equipment or supplies, could be developed which could be operated from an aircraft carrier, it might prove to be a great asset to the amphibious force. If a plane of this size could be used, approximately 60 of them could be operated from one of the large carriers. This would permit the landing of some 1500 fully-equipped personnel from one carrier. It is conceivable that the assault infantry of an RCT might be landed by this method while headquarters units, communication equipment and supplies of the RCT are being landed by helicopter. If the situation was such that a plane landing area was available, parachuting would be unnecessary and the troops could be landed either by gliders or by air-ground transport on to the objective area. In case gliders were to be used it is possible that Navy fighter-bombers from combat carriers could be used as tow planes. The use of transport planes or gliders from aircraft carriers as a part of the ship-to-shore movement has certain advantages and limitations. This type of transport has great mobility and has those characteristics which normally will insure the element of surprise in its employment. However, its practical use could be severely limited by unfavorable weather conditions. It also requires that a favorable drop zone or landing zone be available within or adjacent to the beach area. Used alone this type of attack would possess many of those limitations and weaknesses which are inherent to conventional airborne forces, but used as a part of an amphibious landing force team, this type of vertical envelopment might prove invaluable to the landing force. Its range of operation would not be limited by availability of landing fields. Planes could carry maximum loads with

minimum fuel requirements. The flight time would be short and easily protected by fighter cover. This points up another advantage; the same planes could be used to land additional troops or supplies and equipment for assault forces.

A final suggestion for a means of augmenting the ship-to-shore phase is by use of seaplane transports. There are such transports in service today which will carry 130 fully-equipped personnel. According to authorities it is possible and feasible to build seaplane transports of three and four times that capacity for either personnel or equipment. The equipment might include motor transport and tanks. It is predicted that these planes could be designed with a forward ramp and made capable of beaching in the same manner as the Navy's landing ships. Such a means of transport could be very valuable so long as it was afforded the necessary protection and support by other elements of the amphibious attack force. It would possess the great advantages of speed and mobility, which in turn supports the element of surprise. However, it would be somewhat vulnerable to enemy fire, foul weather, and bad surf conditions which might prove to be serious limitations.

• IT WILL BE NOTED that certain characteristics would be common to all the above-mentioned types of transport. They are all capable of increased mobility and speed which in turn supports the principle of strategic and tactical surprise. They are all incapable of carrying heavily equipped forces. All of them would be designed for use in the initial assault landings. They are all transports of seaborne forces capable of sustained action. They would all be capable of supporting one another in an amphibious operation and, furthermore, are capable of being supported by naval gunfire and carrier aircraft, both organic to the amphibious attack force.

It is interesting to consider the assault landing technique which might be developed by use of these types of transports. An amphibious operation might normally be in three phases; the initial assault phase, the support assault phase and the general support phase. The initial assault phase would be that period during which all movement ashore is made by helicopter, carrier transport planes, amphibious transport planes and transport submarines. At the beginning of this period the transport vessels might still be from 50 to 150 miles from the landing beach. This would prove to be a distinct advantage to the attacker as he would not point out his landing area





to the enemy prior to the time the initial assault forces landed. The support assault phase would follow the initial assault phase and during this phase, movement ashore would be accomplished by use of the fast surface transports discharging their preloaded boats while underway near the landing beach. The support assault forces might include infantry reinforcements, medium artillery, medium tanks, engineering equipment, etc. The general support phase would commence after the conventional troop transports, cargo vessels and landing ships had moved to within five or ten thousand yards of the landing beach. This phase would be very similar to the assault and general unloading phase as practiced at the end of World War II, except that greater dispersion would be employed.

To further develop this technique it is essential that we consider the capabilities of our potential enemy. It is common knowledge that he has the most impressive array of armor and artillery that the world has ever seen. His tactics are those of overwhelming force and power. His chief weaknesses are his means of transport and his methods of logistical support. One small country defeated his efforts to overrun it in 1939 by channelizing his armor, destroying his transport, and cutting off his logistical support. It would be physically impossible for an amphibious force to land sufficient armor, artillery, and equipment in the initial assault phase against a defended beach to defeat such an enemy on terrain where he can effectively use his armor. Furthermore, if the landing force was to be increased to heavier and heavier proportions in an attempt to meet head on with such an enemy, it would only be destroying its versatility and its efficiency as a mobile fighting force. The greatest problem in amphibious operations today is logistics. Every pound increase in armor and artillery causes a corresponding five to 10 pound increase in the required logistics. The solution is not to try to match the enemy's power and force, in the early stages of an amphibious operation, but to alter our tactics. We must force him to play a game in which his armor and artillery won't have all the advantages. We should capitalize on the weaknesses of armor. Rough terrain is one of its most constant enemies. Poor visibility is another weakness. Its tremendous logistic demands is still another. Why then shouldn't we make our amphibious landings in areas where the enemy's

armor is of little use to him and where, if it is used, it is channelized and made a victim of naval gunfire and carrier-borne fighter-bomber aircraft? Why not force him to fight on our terms until our beachhead is firmly established and we are able to mass sufficient armor and fire power ashore to launch an attack against his heavy forces?

In continuing with this new landing force technique, let us consider the application of the three phases mentioned above. The element of surprise should be easily gained in the initial assault phase. The helicopter, seaplane, and paratroop forces have the big advantage of speed and mobility and can approach the landing area without revealing its location until they actually land. The transport submarines could stay submerged, move into the landing area and surface only at night or at the time they are to land their troops. It would be possible to land any or all of these forces under cover of darkness, fog or smoke which would add still further to the element of surprise.

THE FIRST OBJECTIVE of the initial assault force would be the initial force-beachhead-line which includes the high ground overlooking and dominating the landing beach. In the past, taking this FBHL has meant a long and bloody uphill fight for the assault units. Once the initial FBHL is occupied, a defense, facing inland, would be set up and at the same time additional forces would clear the area down to the landing beach. The forces defending the FBHL, with the advantage of observation and dominating terrain and the use of naval gunfire and close air support to supplement their organic weapons, can break up any counterattack the enemy can initiate on less favorable type of terrain. The initial FBHL would not necessarily include the main landing beach to be used to land the heavy supporting forces. The initial assault forces must land on dominating terrain which is unfavorable to enemy armor. Such terrain and initial assault force landing area may be adjacent to and on one or both sides of the main landing area which must be suitable for the landing of heavy armor and equipment. Once the assault force has secured the dominating terrain in the main landing area, clearing the main landing beach and protecting it against enemy counterattacks should prove comparatively easy due to the advantage of terrain and observation. This technique would require a very careful study, evaluation and selection of terrain. Terrain is often the most influential factor in any military operation. Choice of the ground, on which the decisive battle is to take place, has always been one of the chief advantages of the attacker. It would, therefore, be of greatest benefit to the landing force to choose that terrain which is most suited to its cause so as to use the terrain as an additional weapon against the enemy.

Those forces landing from the fast surface transports

during the support assault phase could be landed during either daylight or darkness on a beach already secured by the initial assault force. This force may still be subjected to enemy artillery and air action but it should have little effect due to the short time this portion of the landing force is in the landing area prior to its actual arrival on the beach. Upon landing, this force would reinforce and further advance the FBHL to cover the landing of the general support force, which would commence its landing soon after the support assault force had gotten ashore.

In summarizing the role of the Marine Corps as an amphibious force, the following facts are apparent. Due to the new weapons which have been developed during the last decade there is a real need for a revision of the ship-to-shore landing technique. This change in the technique must allow for greater dispersion of the vessels of the amphibious force and demands that new methods be developed to transport personnel and equipment from the ships to the shore. New means of transport must be developed to fulfill the requirements of the landing force, increase its mobility and enhance its ability to capitalize on the element of surprise. It is the Marine Corps' responsibility to develop new techniques in amphibious operations so it is incumbent upon the Marine Corps to hasten developments to the utmost and test their practicability, as elements of the amphibious force. Suggestions made above may not be entirely practical but they are ideas which might be developed and which might strengthen the weak link of the amphibious attack.

USMC

The possible use of an atomic bomb precludes the massing of ships and men in transport areas prior to an amphibious attack. Our ship-to-shore techniques must be overhauled to get speed and dispersal.



# Aviators Should Fly

Marine pilots should be masters of their specialty, the art of flying. They cannot be jacks of all trades and expert fliers, too. Give them more flight instruction, more time in the air, and less ground officer training, says the author, and the Marine Corps will have better pilots

By Capt Lynn W. Griffitts

THE MARINE GROUND FORCES HAVE ALWAYS ENJOYED the reputation of being able to put the best fighting men available anywhere in the world into immediate action in the field or on the beach. One of the main reasons they can do this is because of intense, specialized training in the primary function they perform.


Does Marine aviation train its pilots in the same way, that is, with the most emphasis being put on specialized training in the primary functions they perform? The answer generally is no. Before the denials to that statement start flying let me restate that we are speaking of aviation in general. Certainly the career management practice of rotating aviators from billet to billet at certain specified intervals and the syllabi set up for training in fighter and transport squadrons will accomplish training. The only difficulty is that these programs set up on paper are many times not carried out due to the exigencies of the service. Too often the aviators who become proficient in administrative or other non-flying duties are penalized by being forced to remain in that type of work for years. Their efficiency as pilots naturally drops when they are limited to a minimum of flight time.

Let us consider the training of pilots in flight squadrons. Is it the primary concern of these pilots to train themselves to carry out the flight mission of their squadrons? The answer again is all too often no. When a pilot checks into a squadron he is usually assigned a primary duty such as adjutant, material officer, personnel officer or any one of many different jobs. Theoretically, according to military occupational specialties, these jobs are secondary to flying. Are they actually?

It seems to be axiomatic in the Corps that a pilot is a Marine officer first, then an aviator. This is as it should be, but it is interpreted to mean a Marine ground officer first then an aviator. Many commanding officers emphasize the fact that fitness reports have no place for flying qualifications, therefore performance of ground duties determines the marks an officer receives.

On the fitness reports of Marine aviators there is attached a supplemental flight fitness report; however, little importance seems to be attached to it by commanding officers and selection boards never see them. They are not filed in the official file jacket of the officer concerned. Actually there is no information available in a Marine aviator's file jacket, or anywhere else, to indicate how well he performs his duties as a pilot. This results in a two-fold disadvantage. First, if a particularly capable pilot is desired for an assignment he can only be selected on the basis of the reputation he has established by word of mouth. Secondly, it is possible for a very inept pilot to get by for years unless he happens to have a commanding officer recommend him for a pilot reclassification board. Most commanding officers are reluctant to take such action.

It can readily be seen that a flying officer's main attention is focused on non-flying duties. Is this a desirable situation? In the event of combat would these officers have received the best possible training and background to fit them for their flying duties? It must be admitted that a knowledge of administrative functions is necessary for any officer. In the case of aviators should its attainment exclude training and supervision in flight subjects to the extent it does at the present time?



Even when a Marine aviator goes to a Marine service school or takes a correspondence course he finds flight subjects taking a secondary role. There are few courses available to help him meet his daily problems in aviation. When he attends the Amphibious Warfare Courses at Quantico he finds that the great majority of his studies and field exercises do more to prepare him for duty with the line than with aviation. The extension courses provided fall into the same category. The flying officers who attend these schools or take the extension courses find themselves learning about "two up and one back," but very little about highside runs or how to load a transport airplane. The basic idea behind all this type of training is good. If Marine aviation is to support the ground forces, then its officers should be familiar with the problems of forces on the ground. Then too, in an emergency an aviation captain might find himself in command of a company. The difficulty is that little of all this training is retained by an aviator. It is like pouring water on a duck's back to give an aviator all the theory of ground warfare with no practical experience. One who cannot swim may read a dozen manuals on the subject and may be able to write a perfect examination paper on swimming, but when he falls in the water he discovers that a little practice is better than all the theory in the world. We seem to be trying to make ground officers out of aviators by sending them to school. It would be far better to transfer them to line units for a few months than it is to send them to school for years. A few months should be the limit as a longer period would result in such a loss in flight efficiency that the purpose would be defeated. The exchange program of officers between ground and aviation units, now discontinued, was very good except that the period of two years was too long. Six months should be the maximum.

When Marine aviators go to school they should spend the largest part of their time studying aerial tactics, aviation logistics, and operational control of aircraft. Without such training they cannot expect to gain the same preeminence as fighting men in the air that the ground forces have gained as fighting men on the ground. The Marine Corps Schools should reconsider the courses of studies available to aviators. A new syllabus for aviators should be written putting primary emphasis on aviation matters and secondary emphasis on ground subjects.

It must be decided whether Marine aviators are to be "jacks of all trades and masters of none" or whether they will be specialists in their primary duties so that we may be assured of the best air arm it is possible to produce.

The picture is not all black. The Marine Corps does maintain several good aviation technical schools whose scope covers all phases of technical matters such as engineering and ordnance. Also the Air Force makes available a few openings in their tactical schools but the number of Marine aviators attending is very small.

Aviation tables of organization should be revised so that aviators will have more time for flying and flight training. Non-flying officers should be used in the most time consuming jobs. Aviators should be given the time and opportunity to keep abreast of all the latest developments in the aviation field and should be required to do so. More attention should be given to their actual performance in the air and it should be reflected in their fitness reports.

Until changes are made in the training and employment of Marine aviators, the Marine Corps may have a good air arm simply because they are Marines, but it will not be as good as the proper emphasis on flying could make it.

USMC





Wide World photo

### 1. Stalinism and Communism

IT IS GENERAL PRACTICE WITH POLITICAL WRITERS, nowadays, to make a distinction between Stalinism and just plain Communism; and it is in keeping with the pragmatic approach to existing problems favoured by the vast majority of these writers that they use this distinction to give to plain Communism a faint aura of respectability while Stalinism is rejected with horror. We have only to read in our newspapers and magazines about Tito's Yugoslavia or about the trials of such Communist stalwarts as Rajk or Kostov, to find that this distinction is being made and that the public is being educated to see the difference. Similarly, not so long ago, Hitler and his gang of Nazis were presented as devils incarnate, while the orthodox Nazis, men who subscribed fully to the National Socialist Party's nefarious programme but not to Hitler's party leadership—Otto Strasser and Rauschnigg are two better known representatives of this

By SqdrnLdr John Gellner, RCAF

latter group—were given sanctuary, and were generally viewed with sympathy. It seems that, for better or for worse, this differentiation between Stalinist and non-Stalinist Communism has also crept into the policies of the external affairs departments of the democratic powers. Whether a man is a Stalinist or a plain Communist thus has, and apparently will have in future, considerable significance. Consequently, it will be necessary to examine the term "Stalinism" before we try and draw up a Who's Who of today's Communist leadership.

The credo of all Communists is Marx's and Engels' Communist Manifesto. The Marxian doctrine covers a wider field than is covered by other philosophies of life; it is in fact a philosophy of life and a kind of political constitution combined. It contains three massive theories: A philosophic theory which, like religion, offers an explanation of life and of the world surrounding us; an economic theory; and a theory of the State and of revolution. A philosophy of life (a religion) must be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. A Communist is thus a person who accepts the Marxist doctrine, stock, lock and barrel, in the moral as well as in the economic and in the political fields. Those who accept only one facet of the Marxist doctrine cannot be called Communists. Thus today's atheistic philosophers like the pragmatists or the logical positivists (whose theories are all pretty close to Marx's dialectical materialism) are not necessarily Com-

# Leaders of

munists; nor can the Socialists, who accept Marx's economic theories, be rightly called Communists. Once we have narrowed the field down to those who accept all of Marxism, we come to the conclusion that, on the theoretical side at least, there is no difference at all between the Stalinist Communists on one side, and the non-Stalinist, or even anti-Stalinist, Communists on the other. To put it into the simplest terms, they all aim at world revolution which is to bring about the Marxian paradise of a classless society. Anti-Stalinist Communists have made this quite clear. To quote an example, Edvard Kardelj, Tito's chief lieutenant and the most outspoken of the critics of Stalin and of Russian leadership of world Communism, was quoted as saying: "Between us and America there is an unbridgeable chasm. We are two worlds. They cannot be united. When we are victorious over the American world, the world will be one." No Stalinist could have said it more succinctly.

If there is a difference between Stalinists and non-Stalinists, it can only be on the practical side. While all Communists chant: "There is no God except Marx,"

the Stalinists add: "and Stalin is his prophet." The non-Stalinists have no fault to find with Marx's famous dictum (in the Manifesto) that the aims of Communism ". . . can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions," but they want to find their own way towards this goal; the Stalinists, like the Hitlerites, profess to be satisfied with following the road traced for them by their leader. From the latter they even accept interpretations of Marxism which would sound most dubious to the non-Stalinists. To use a parallel with a split in an American political party where no basic principles were involved, the apparent dissension between Stalinist and non-Stalinist Communists may be likened to the split between the party-line Democrats and the Dixiecrats in the presidential elections of 1948. When we study the men who are today the leaders of world Communism, we must never lose sight of the fact that they are generals who have completely agreed on a single strategy, but who have some differences in matters of supreme command and of tactics.

## 2. The Old Guard of Stalinism

• SURPRISING as it may seem, the Stalinists have, in practical politics, been so far a force towards moderation (the word "moderation" is used here in a relative sense, and only as far as such a designation can at all be applied to a movement bent on "the forcible overthrow of all

existing social conditions"). The Stalinists add: "and Stalin is his prophet." The non-Stalinists have no fault to find with Marx's famous dictum (in the Manifesto) that the aims of Communism ". . . can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions," but they want to find their own way towards this goal; the Stalinists, like the Hitlerites, profess to be satisfied with following the road traced for them by their leader. From the latter they even accept interpretations of Marxism which would sound most dubious to the non-Stalinists. To use a parallel with a split in an American political party where no basic principles were involved, the apparent dissension between Stalinist and non-Stalinist Communists may be likened to the split between the party-line Democrats and the Dixiecrats in the presidential elections of 1948. When we study the men who are today the leaders of world Communism, we must never lose sight of the fact that they are generals who have completely agreed on a single strategy, but who have some differences in matters of supreme command and of tactics.


Among the Communist leaders, only the spineless and the Stalin-worshippers were able to follow their master through the dialectical acrobatics which the big swing in Soviet policy necessitated. They lost themselves in the wilderness of Stalin's unpredictable policy of expediency. Some of them became as fascinated with Stalin as the top Nazis were fascinated by Hitler. Others were stunned by the fantastic accusations levelled against, and by the slaughter of, their friends; they probably became too numb to think for themselves. To these morally broken men Stalin entrusted the direction of world Communism.

Of the Russian paragons of Stalinism three demand

# World Communism

existing social conditions"). Stalin's repeated warnings that there must be no gambling with the security of the Soviet Union and that, in consequence, world revolution must not be attempted until victory is certain, are responsible for this "go-slow" policy. The liquidation of the Trotzkyites in the late Twenties, and the unprecedented bloodbath of the middle Thirties in which most of the Old Communists died, were, among other reasons, brought about by Stalin's resolve to remove the Communists of strict observance who in their orthodoxy refused to follow his subtle and devious policy of deception, and who wanted to raise at once the red banner of world revolution. Real Stalinism was born early in 1934. At that time Stalin, worried over the security of the USSR which seemed to be threatened by Hitler's Germany from the West and by Japan from the East, made his most daring political somersault; from a policy of isolation of Communist Russia from the capitalist world and of revolutionary extremism abroad, he abruptly turned to a policy of apparent friendship and collaboration with anybody who could be expected to stand by the USSR, if the latter

special attention: Molotov, Malenkov, and Manuilsky. The first is one of the few engineers of the October Revolution of 1917 who is still alive. This distinction he probably owes to the fact that, differently from most of the men around Lenin, he is not a Marxist theoretician (and thus is not hampered by scruples whenever Communist doctrine is batted about in Stalin's practical politics), and that he is probably the original Stalinist, the unquestioning lieutenant of his master. He appears to be colourless and pedantic, if able, stubborn, and energetic. He may well be the eternal Number Two man, not only in Politburo listings but also in Stalin's estimation. He has been comparatively little active in the world Communist movement, although for a time he held the portfolio for Comintern affairs, and although occasionally he has been given important missions in the field of Soviet relations with non-Russian communist parties (e.g. he intervened when, in the late Twenties, the United States Communist Party was in danger of splitting over the dispute between its two top men, Lovestone and Foster). If seniority mattered, Molotov, who is 60 and has been a Communist for



**Molotov, unquestionable lieutenant of his master and eternal Number Two man.**

time of the volte-face of 1934. He had no trouble following the devious routes of Stalin's policies. He is no Marxist theoretician at all (he even spoke slightly of orthodox Marxism, and got into hot water over it, in 1946), and he is a hand-picked Stalin man. He is something of a Goering (without the latter's ridiculous fancies) in the present Soviet set-up. The rotund Reichs-Marschall also probably knew little of National Socialist doctrine, and did not care whether he knew; he was satisfied to uphold Hitler's power and his own, whatever the basis of that power. Goering, too, started as a Nazi street-fighter, to become a war-time economic czar. Up to the time of his fall from Hitler's grace, he was Nazidom's heir apparent. Malenkov fought with the Red Guards in the Russian Civil War; in the Second World War he was a successful head of Soviet tank and plane production; he is, presently, considered the man who would succeed Stalin upon the latter's demise. There is, however, some doubt on the latter point. True, Malenkov is a proven administrator; he also has much experience in the direction of world Communism through his position as Stalin's deputy in the function of Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the USSR; he was groomed for leadership of the international Communist movement (e.g. he is the co-founder, and probably the present director, of the Cominform); his comparative youth (he is 48) is in his favour. On the other hand, Stalin must be well aware that the most serious points of criticism levelled against him by the non-Stalinist Communists are that he is deviating from Marxist doctrine, and that he is substituting the dictatorship of Stalin for the dictatorship of the proletariat. World Communism is the Soviet Union's strongest weapon, infinitely more potent than aircraft, tanks, and guns. Stalin knows that this weapon must not be blunted (his hurried return to Com-

over 40 years, should be Stalin's successor. He would be, if the head of the Communist Party of the USSR did not have to be both chief administrator of Russia *and* leader of world Communism. To the former function Molotov would bring ability, experience, and Stalinesque caution; he probably does not have what it takes to fill Stalin's shoes in the direction of Communism's worldwide conspiracy.

Malenkov does not, strictly speaking, belong to the Old Guard, although he already held high office in the Soviet hierarchy at the

unist orthodoxy after the conclusion of the Second World War was probably, to a large extent, brought about by his fear of alienating the died-in-the-wool Communists at a time when, with the USSR safe, this was no longer necessary). There is much reason to believe that to the Communists of the world Malenkov would be no prophet. By those who met him, Malenkov is described as dour, cold, mirthless, crude and brutal of speech. He is probably among the most belligerent of the members of the Politburo.

In his very able book "World Communism Today," Martin Ebon says that "if any one man coordinates the activities of world Communism today, that man may well be Manuilsky." Manuilsky, who is 67, certainly has all the attributes of a leader of international Communism: he is a very old Communist (he already participated in the abortive revolution of 1905); he brought the Ukraine, always vacillating and even now a difficult area for the Moscow government, into the fold of the USSR; he has decades of experience in Comintern politics; he is undoubtedly a Communist of strictest observance, extremely well versed in Marxist doctrine. He also must be utterly devoted to Stalin, otherwise he could not have survived purge after purge although he has three great liabilities, each of which would have destroyed a lesser man: he has lived in the West for many years; he has been a Menshevik (he, and Foreign Minister Vyshinski are the last of the surviving leaders of the long ago crushed opposition in the Russian Communist Party); he has once been close to the old leaders of Russian Communism who died in the blood purges of the Thirties. Ostensibly, Manuilsky is no more than a cabinet minister of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and the chief representative of the Ukraine at the United Nations.

With a few exceptions (Mao Tse-tung is one), the non-Russian old-time Communist leaders of today all have two things in common: they have lived for long periods in the USSR; and they have done little personal fighting in the Communist undergrounds of their homelands. Consequently, they are thoroughly indoctrinated Stalinists, and their prestige among their Communist compatriots is a reflection of Stalin's glory rather than the result of their own exertions. Space only permits to deal with a few of them. From a group of greater or lesser luminaries we have picked the leaders of the four most important Communist parties outside the USSR: Maurice Thorez of France; Palmiro Togliatti of Italy; Wilhelm Pieck of



**Wide World photo**  
**Malenkov, hand-picked by Stalin, helped to found the Cominform.**

Germany; and Mao Tse-tung of China. We will make fleeting mention of a few other members of Stalin's Old Guard whose influence is felt in the international Communist movement.

As a tactician, Maurice Thorez has no peer among contemporary Communist leaders in non-Communist countries. No other followed the quirks and bends of Stalin's politics so faithfully, and got away with it both with the Kremlin *and* with his own compatriots. In the times of revolutionary extremism he was a "professional revolutionary" (this is Thorez' own expression) and he did much to keep French political and economic life in ferment. Came the big swing in Soviet policy towards world co-operation in defense against Nazism and Fascism. Almost immediately Thorez executed his own turn-about from obstruction to active work towards a united front of French Left, and Center parties. In the elections of 1936 the French Communists did not fight the Socialists (who usually are "social fascists" to the Communists) nor the bourgeois Radical Socialists (who usually rate the designation of "Wall Street lackeys"). They won with them, and with them they formed the ill-fated Popular Front. In it Thorez worked under Léon Blum whom, three years later, in the halcyon days of Soviet-German friendship, he regaled with such epithets as "repulsive reptile," "snake," "bourgeois exploiter," and "chained dog." Again, the pendulum swung in August 1939: Stalin and Hitler had become friends.

Thorez, had he remained in France, would have had a hard time defending Germany, the arch-enemy of France. He chose to avoid induction into the French Army (he was called up as a reservist) by desertion and flight to Russia. When the latter event took place is not certain, but probabilities are that the escape took place before the German attack of 1940. Although a deserter who had failed France in her hour of need, he managed to resume leadership of the

French Communist Party over the heads of Communist resistance leaders who, after Germany had again become Russia's enemy, had energetically fought against the Nazis on French soil. Following the Kremlin's post-war policy of infiltration, Thorez at first led his Communists into another united front of French Left, and Center parties. This was perhaps lucky for France, because Communist participation in the government meant peace on the labour front and, in consequence, speedier economic recovery. In this period French Communism thrived; the

party became France's strongest. Then, as is so often the case, the interests of Moscow clashed with those of the local Communists. The Politburo was backing the uprising in the French Empire (in Indo-China and in Madagascar). Adroitly, for a second time, Thorez made his party follow a policy opposed to obvious French national interests. The Communists were ousted from the government coalition; they suffered set-backs in elections; they lost ground in the trade-union movement; and their influence with the workers diminished. Thorez, the Stalinist, remains undaunted. It will be interesting to see what the Communist strength will be in the next French general elections which must be held by 1951. Chances are that they will poll rather better than 20% of the popular vote. It is frightening that one out of every five citizens of one of the most important of the North Atlantic Treaty countries should be a Communist. It is doubly frightening that this Communist mass should be led by so devoted a follower of Moscow's leadership as is Maurice Thorez.

All through the long reign of Fascism in Italy, Palmiro Togliatti was the non-resident leader of the Italian Communist underground. His headquarters were in Moscow, and from there he made his followers fight. In the late Twenties, at the height of Moscow's policy of revolutionary extremism, he ordered the Italian Communists into open rebellion against the Fascist state, a policy so patently hopeless that Togliatti, who is a very shrewd man, can have consented to it only because he was out of touch with Italian realities, or perhaps because he simply was a disciplined soldier of the Comintern. In the Second World War he did not join the Communist partisan groups fighting the Germans. He returned to Southern Italy by air from Moscow once that part of the country was liberated by troops of the Western democracies. As was the case in France, in Italy too, the popular and successful Communist resistance leaders fell obediently in line behind a man who had safely sat out abroad Fascist terror and Nazi occupation. Because Togliatti is a Stalinist, his maneuvering after the Second World War was very much the same as that of his French counterpart, Thorez.

First, ostensible cooperation with a "united front" government; a success of infiltration such as Thorez never achieved when the majority faction of the Socialist Party allowed itself to be absorbed into a Communist-dominated Popular Front; underhand activities leading to the oust-



Wide World photo

**Chief coordinator of world Communism activities may well be Manuilsky.**

**France's Maurice Thorez used tactics similar to those of Togliatti, but more adroit.**

Wide World photo



## RIGHT: Palmiro Togliatti, Italy's leading Communist.

ing of the Communists from the government coalition; open obstruction and civil disobedience once the Communist Party found itself on the opposition benches. Togliatti has shown himself less adroit than Thorez, and, as a result, the Communist Party has lost comparatively more ground in Italy than its counterpart in France. The Communists are, however, still very strong in parts of Italy (it is estimated that they would poll today about 20% of the votes in a general election against approximately 30% in 1948). Togliatti has also shown some slight tendency to waver when it comes to balancing Italy's interests against those of the USSR. In the dispute over Trieste, at a time when Moscow still backed Yugoslavia's claims, Togliatti failed to give immediate support to a policy of further cessions of Italian territory so repugnant to his countrymen. He repented quickly, though, and now that Moscow is against Tito for a change, he is again fully in line, on the Trieste-question as on all others, with Stalin's policies.

Germany used to be Communism's main stronghold outside the USSR. There was a time when Germany might well have become a Communist state, what with a (admittedly shaky) Soviet Republic established in Bavaria, and a Communist revolution raging through the streets of Berlin. Wilhelm Pieck, who is now the president of the Communist Democratic German Republic, was in on the Berlin "coup." When the Army suppressed the revolution, he avoided summary trial and swift execution which German Army officers meted out in the heady and lawless days after victory, by implying that he might turn informer, and then escaping. The (now utterly incomprehensible) German policy of the Comintern later helped to ruin German Communism, and to smooth Hitler's rise to power. Ruth Fischer, alias Elfriede Friedlaender, sister of the notorious Gerhart Eisler (considered the Number One Communist in the United States, and now a cabinet minister in Eastern Germany) and herself a former leading European Communist, vividly described (in *Life*, May 8, 1950) the utter bewilderment of the German Communists when Moscow decreed that Nazism was the lesser danger compared with Western capitalism, and that it was the latter which was to be fought in Germany. Mrs Fischer states that even after the Nazis seized power in Germany, critics were told by V. Knorin, then Stalin's expert on Germany: "Comrades, it is the policy of the Vozhd (Stalin) himself that the German Communist Party should not fight against the Nazis." Pieck did not criticize, at least not until well after Stalin had made his political somersault of 1934. He escaped to Russia and thus again avoided the fate of his Communist colleagues who were killed wholesale by the Nazis. He spent the years of the Terror, and of the Second World War, in Russia; he returned to Germany in 1945 after an absence



Wide World photo

of 12 years, in the wake of the Red Army. It is up to Pieck to restore to German Communism its former position of strongest Communist movement outside the USSR. He faces many difficulties. He now as ever toes the Stalinist line, a policy discredited with those who remember the debacle of 1933. He has to support and extol many things which the Germans are loath to accept: the ransacking of Eastern Germany by the Russians; the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of German prisoners-of-war; the loss of the provinces east of the Oder and Neisse and the expulsion of their German populations; the overlordship of, and his obvious subservience to, the Russians who, to the average German, are nothing but barbarians. On Pieck's side there is the power of the police state; the inducements which he can offer to former Nazis, to the militarists, and to the youth. To his task he brings the qualities of the obedient servant. Neither self-respect nor nationalism have ever made him hesitate to do what the Soviet leadership required of him. One could even imagine him smiling happily while saying "yes" and "amen" to the cession to Poland of more than one fifth of Germany.

How anybody who has studied Mao Tse-tung's political life could have seen in him anything but a devoted Stalinist, is beyond comprehension. Yet the same wishful thinkers who maintained that China's Communists were not really Communists, persist in picturing Mao as a potential Asiatic Tito. The truth is that Mao was picked for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party by the Comintern, and that the latter always viewed his performance with approval; and that Mao yields to no one in his record of strictest conformity with every change of Stalin's policy. In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek had suppressed the Communist faction of the Kuomintang, the then secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party, Chen Tu-hsiu, was made the Comintern's scapegoat. Mao was brought up to replace him. This was the period of revolutionary extremism, and, under Mao's leadership, the Chinese Communists fought a civil war against the Kuomintang,

a war in which both sides showed little mercy. In the end, Mao led the famous "long march" to Yenan so that his decimated legions might rest and reorganize with their rear covered by Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia. It was just then that Stalin went over to the policy of a united democratic front against the threat from the fascists dictatorships. In the midst of civil war, and to the dismay of many of his followers who simply did not understand what was happening, Mao smoothly made his personal volte-face. In extending the olive branch to the Kuomintang, Mao not only promised to fight against the Japanese at the side of his former enemies, but he went so far as to pledge himself to abandon demands for land reform, and

to discontinue Communist propaganda (to reassure their bewildered followers, the Chinese Communist leadership quickly issued a pamphlet for restricted distribution, in which they called the deal with the Kuomintang a "temporary compromise" on the road to Communism's ultimate victory). Nor did the German-Soviet Treaty of 1939 cause Mao any difficulties; obediently he began to repeat Moscow's "imperialist war" propaganda, only to switch over to another tune as soon as Stalin's honeymoon with Hitler was over. In the war against Japan the Chinese Communists fought on the same side as the Chinese Nationalists rather than together with them. The "temporary compromise" ended as quickly in China as it did elsewhere in the world. By the Fall of 1949, Mao Tse-tung who, 22 years before, had taken over the Chinese Communist Party at the depth of defeat, was master of China. Ever since, he has affirmed and re-affirmed his loyalty to Stalin, and he has made his pilgrimage to Moscow. The Communist victory in China was the result of a policy of long standing. Martin Ebon, in his already quoted book, recalls that as far back as 1935, when the tattered remnants of the Chinese Communist forces had just only staggered into Yenan, Manuilsky stated at the Seventh Comintern Congress that "the first place among the Communist parties of the world, right after the Bolsheviks of the USSR, belongs to that of China." What was then a prophecy, has become true today. And at the head of the Number Two Communist party stands a man whom Moscow has never had reason to distrust.

We have seen that even among those Old Guard Stalinists there are hues and nuances, that among them are men of all kinds, from the mutely obedient Piecks to the Togliattis with their little patriotic scruples. The real "deviationists" among the Old Bolsheviks have, however, been liquidated long ago, and no real resistance to the dictates of Moscow can be expected from the carefully screened few who are left. From time to time, however, when one of the old-time Stalinists dies of a sudden illness, rumours crop up which indicate that all is not goodwill and sunshine even among the faithful. Ruth Fischer quotes "an old GPU saying that any fool can commit an assassination, but it takes a real artist to arrange a good natural death," and she provides much detail just how the famous Dimitrov, ex-chairman of the Comintern and pillar of Stalinism, died (in 1949) in Russia of "diabetes, a liver ailment and complications." Now, it is perfectly possible Dimitrov was an incurable diabetic, or that Zhdanov, member of the Politburo, head of the Cominform, and long considered Stalin's heir, really died of arteriosclerosis in 1948. What arouses suspicion is that these apparently natural deaths were always followed by major

LEFT: Mao Tse Tung, long a Stalinist, was hand-picked as China's Communist leader by the Comintern.



"purges" among the dead leaders' followers. The "purge" of the Zhdanov-men was a major operation even by Moscow standards, and engulfed, among many others, a member of the Politburo, Nikolaj Vozneshenski. The "purge" following Dimitrov's demise brought to the scaffold Traicho Kostov, secretary-general of the Bulgarian Communist Party. There are others among the Stalinist Old Guard who have occasional lapses into independence. To quote but one example, Klement Gottwald, Communist leader of Czechoslovakia, was among those who criticized the German policy of the Comintern, and, in 1947, went so far as to approve Czechoslovakia's participation in the Marshall Plan (he recanted quickly after a summons to Moscow and the dressing-down he probably got there). In general, however, the Piecks far outnumber the Togliattis among the Stalinist leaders of World communism.

### 3. The Younger Set

THE OLD-TIME PALLADINS of Stalinism had all chosen Communism at a time when the movement had not much more to offer than "blood, sweat and tears." There is no doubt that, to a man, they are ideological Communists. The younger set falls into two main categories: the first, found so far only in the USSR and in China, is composed of those who have gone, from childhood, through the Communist educational mill; the other comprises persons who have chosen Communism after its initial struggles following the First World War. Few in the first group have, so far, risen to the top positions in the Communist hierarchy, where seniority counts for more than it does in the Democratic system. The second group is much more interesting, because it contains a great number of pure opportunists to whom Communism is simply a label which they have attached to the exercise of their power. These people can, and do, recite long passages from Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but they do it unbelievingly, cynically. Because they lack convictions, they are just as apt to climb down from the Communist band-wagon if the ride becomes too bumpy, as they were eager to climb onto it. Where the Marxist believers like Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, and Bukharin, and, more recently, Rajk, Kostov, Gomulka, and Clementis, stood their ground (al-

**Wilhelm Pieck, President of the Soviet-sponsored East German Republic, avoided trial and execution.**

Wide World photo



though many of them could have easily sought, and got, sanctuary in the capitalist countries) and knew, if necessary, to die with flying colours, the unprincipled seekers of power hasten to throw Communism overboard at the slightest sign of personal jeopardy. Into this category fall those foreign representatives of Communist countries who display great zeal in harming and brutally assailing their host countries, but who suddenly find that they are freedom-loving democrats after all, as soon as they are recalled home and they suspect that the summons means that they are to be "purged." These Communist opportunists, despicable as they are, are of some importance because, while they would fight like the next man for themselves, they are not likely to fight for Communism. There are, of course, also many ideological Marxists among those who espoused Communism in more recent years. However, it is worth noting that Communism has never again engendered the fiery enthusiasm for the cause which was a characteristic of the international Communist movement in the years immediately following the First World War.

It will be sufficient if we take a brief look at one representative of the younger set who has risen to leadership in Communist affairs. Enver Hoxha, the ruler of Albania, may well be a convinced Communist, or again he may simply be a Balkan dictator with a Communist nameplate. It is believed that Hoxha began toying with Communism a few years before the Second World War. It is certain that he fully espoused the cause when his activities against the Italian occupation troops forced him underground in 1941. There were two main underground movements in neighbouring Yugoslavia—Tito's and Mihailovich's—and there were two in Albania—the Communist, and the rightist "Balli Kombetar." Hoxha joined the former, perhaps because he was a Communist, or because he shrewdly foresaw who would gain the upper hand in Yugoslavia on which Albania heavily depended, or simply because Tito's forces were the stronger in the mountains of the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Hoxha's guerrillas patterned themselves on Tito's and got substantial support from Yugoslavia. When the end came, Tito as much as put Hoxha into the saddle in Albania. For three years Yugoslav influence was dominant in Tirana; Albania lived to some extent off Yugoslav hand-outs. Came the break between Tito and the Cominform. It is easy to see why Hoxha, although he was Tito's man, sided with the Cominform. Very few people believed at that time that Tito would be able to resist the Soviet Union for long in her own sphere of influence. The Communist rebels in Greece were still going strong, and their hold on the mountainous North of the country provided a link between Albania and the Soviet orbit. Hoxha's decision in favour of Stalinism was accompanied by the usual massacre which characterizes every major shift in Communist policy. It claimed the life of Koci Xoxe,

minister of the interior and secretary-general of the Albanian Communist Party, and of many others. Hoxha's Yugoslav advisers were summarily ejected and Tito, Hoxha's benefactor, subjected to almost hysterical vituperations. It looks now as if, this time, Hoxha might have backed the wrong horse. Tito has not fallen, but the Communist rebellion in Greece has. Albania is completely isolated, and drifting helplessly onto the rocks of economic ruin. Enver Hoxha is being put to the test. There have been recent rumours that pressure is being applied on Albania by both Italy and Yugoslavia with a view to prying the country loose from Moscow. If this is so, then it will soon be shown whether Hoxha is a Stalinist or merely an opportunist.

#### 4. The Non-Conformists

WILLIAM ŠIROKÝ, foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, told his audience in a recent speech with remarkable frankness what seems to be the trouble with the non-Stalinist Communists. In criticizing his "purged" predecessor, Vladimir Clementis, Široký said that Clementis had lost confidence in the policy of the Soviet Union when the latter country concluded its treaty of friendship with Germany in 1939. This was a grievous sin, because absolute confidence in the leadership of the great Stalin is the hallmark of a good Communist. Široký could not have put the difference between Stalinist and non-Stalinist Communism more succinctly. Nobody among the Stalinists seriously believes that Tito, for instance, is not a letter-perfect Marxist, even if they call him "a traitor to the cause of the proletariat;" Tito's sin is that he is not a disciplined soldier of Communism as dispensed from Moscow.

Anti-Stalinism was born in the minds of zealous, yet thinking Communists, who became worried lest Stalin's and Russia's leadership ruin both the nations to which they belonged and international Communism. We have already mentioned Stalin's topsy-turvy German policy, a policy which made an anti-Stalinist of many an old Communist. The civil wars in Spain and in Greece were two other blatant instances of Stalin's callous disregard for Spanish or Greek Communism, and of his single-minded attention to nothing but the advantage of the Soviet Union. When the Civil War began in Spain in the summer of 1936, the Spanish Communists were an insignificant faction on the Republican side. It was the Non-Intervention Policy which gave an opportunity to the Soviet Union to pose as the only friend of the Spanish Republic. Russian advisers (a goodly part of them NKVD operatives) entered Spain with Russian arms. The International Brigades, which fought most valiantly, were to a considerable extent composed of Communists. From all this the Spanish Communist Party profited. It increased its membership, and its influence grew. Had the Republicans won, Spain would probably not have become

a "dictatorship of the proletariat," but the Communist Party would have been in the cockpit, ready to take over when opportunity offered. This, however, did not satisfy the Soviet Union or the Comintern's henchmen. It had to be all or nothing. And so a civil war inside a civil war was fought under Russian direction behind the Republican lines. In the winter of 1936/37, with Franco at the gates of Madrid, Moscow called for the "purging of Trotskyites and Anarcho-Syndicalists," that is, of non-Stalinist Communists and other Leftists, all fighting for the Republic. It may well be that Franco would have won anyway, supported as he was by Germany and Italy, but the internecine fights, the "purges" and phony spy-trials, the never-ending, brutal quest for power on the part of the Communists while there was an external enemy to fight, may well have been contributing causes for the fall of the Spanish Republic. Many Communists thought so.

Ten years later, Moscow's heavy hand fell upon the Communist rebellion in Greece. When the Cominform broke with Tito, in the summer of 1948, the chances of victory were slim for the Greek government forces. Guerrilla strongholds were everywhere, from the Peloponnesus to Greek Thrace. There was a compact area of Communist domination from the Grammos Mountains, along the ridges of the Pindus Range, down to the Gulf of Corinth. Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia—the latter most effectively of all—were giving massive support. The ablest of Tito's generals, Kocha Popovic, was reportedly the guerrillas' chief of operations. At the head of the rebels was Markos Vafiades, a fervent Communist since early manhood, who had fought against the Greek Republic before the Second World War (and had suffered imprisonment and exile for it), against the Germans from 1941 to 1944, and against the royal government after the liberation of Greece. Markos was a soldier and a man of independent judgment. What mattered to him was the victory of Communism in Greece. Much as he probably deplored the rift which split his allies, he knew that he still could win without Bulgarian and Albanian aid, but not without Yugoslav aid. So he refused to break with Tito, thus committing the unforgivable sin of putting the interests of Communism and the good of Greece, as he saw it, before the interests of the USSR. Late in 1948, at a Cominform-meeting in Sofia, Nicholas Zachariades, secretary-general of the Greek Communist Party and a submissive Stalinist, was told to "purge" Markos and his followers. *Time* (February 14, 1949) called this "purge" behind the Communist lines "the best news that gloomy Athens had heard for a long time." The guerrillas got a new commander, a military nonentity by the name of Georgios Vrontissios, who managed to lose the civil war within less than a year. If there can be some doubt whether the "purges" behind the Republican lines decisively influenced the outcome of the Spanish Civil War, there is no

doubt whatsoever that the "purge" of Markos and his men doomed the cause of the Communist guerrillas in Greece.

The majority of the Communist nonconformists come from the ranks of those who have fought hardest and risked most for the sake of Communist victory. Ales Bebler, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, put his finger on the causes of anti-Stalinism among otherwise devoted Communists when he said: "There's a difference between those of us who have fought for power and those who have had it handed down to them on a platter by the Red Army. If you have fought, you have different ideas and feelings about your rights." The description of "those who have fought" fits admirably two outstanding men among the anti-Stalinist Communists, one who has recently been "purged," and another who, to the discomfort of Moscow, is still very much alive: Hungary's Laszlo Rajk, and Yugoslavia's Tito. Rajk, who became a Communist in 1930, spent the first 15 years of his party-career either fighting underground, or fighting in the open (in the Spanish Civil War), or in jail. It may well be that his experiences in Spain shattered his confidence in Stalin's leadership, even if they made him an even more determined Communist. He became minister of the interior of Communist Hungary. He must have fretted working under Rakosy and his Moscow henchmen, and looking at the economic ruin wrought in Hungary by the Russian occupation. In his trial in Budapest, last year, Rajk confessed that he worked with Tito towards a Communist Eastern Europe free of Russian tutelage. He died on the scaffold.

Tito has given his name to Communist nationalism, just as Quisling gave his to all collaborators with the Nazis. The substance of "Titoism" is contained in a passage of a letter which the Yugoslav leader wrote to Stalin on April 13, 1948: "Even though we love the USSR, we cannot love our country less." Tito was originally a faithful Stalinist and a favorite of the Comintern. He had the long spells of residence in the USSR characteristic of all Stalinist bigwigs (and so necessary for their careers). His first entry into Russia was involuntary: as an NCO in the Austro-Hungarian Army in the First World War he was captured by the Russians. From a POW-camp he enlisted (in 1917) in the Red Army and fought through the Civil War. Altogether he remained in Russia for nine years, returning to Yugoslavia in 1924. The next 10 years Tito spent in Communist underground work and in Yugoslav jails. In 1934, after he had served a five-year prison sentence, he went again to Russia. By that time he had risen high in Comintern circles. He worked under Dimitrov in the Comintern's Balkan headquarters in Vienna, and from there was promoted in 1937 to the secretary-generalship of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which was then working underground, in illegality. Up to the time when, in 1941, he organized his Partisan movement, he



Wide World photo

**Top Czechoslovak Communists: Zapotocky, Gottwald, and Siroky. Siroky's predecessor was purged after "losing confidence" in policy of the Soviet Union.**

had no quarrel with Moscow. It was during the years of guerrilla fighting in the Yugoslav mountains that he must have become suspicious of the policy of the USSR, while he himself became suspect in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. While the top command of the Partisans was undoubtedly staunchly Communist, their ranks were open to anybody who wanted to fight Germans and Italians. Outside help came from the West, Russian help was not forthcoming. Tito knew well that this was so because Moscow frowned upon partisan movements with political aims, indeed forbade explicitly, in an order issued to all European Communists early in 1943, the formation of any kind of resistance government before the arrival in the area of the victorious Red Army. With his eyes on the future, Tito chose to disobey. In November 1943 he formed an Anti-Fascist Council of Liberation as provisional government of Yugoslavia, and made Jajce the provisional capital. At that time the Germans still held every major town, railway or road in the country. The unseemly haste in which the Red Army tried to get into Belgrade ahead of the Partisans; the behavior of the Russian troops; and the friction which soon developed between Tito's government and the Russian military and political authorities in Yugoslavia, all made Tito even more resolved to keep "Yugoslavia for the Yugoslavs." He would have preferred, of course, to live in peace with Moscow and, after the war, he tried hard to toe the Stalinist line while keeping his independence. He did not succeed for long to hunt with the dogs and to run with the hare. The break with Stalin came early in 1948. The official reasons for Tito's condemnation were given in the

Cominform communiqué of June 28, 1948, as "following an incorrect line in the basic questions of foreign and domestic policy" and "carrying out a hateful policy in relation to the USSR." Both accusations were undoubtedly justified from the Stalinist point of view: Tito had tried to strengthen Yugoslavia in her quest for independence by working towards a federation of the Balkan states; he had also kept the MVD out of Yugoslavia, and he had resisted Soviet economic exploitation of his country. What was much worse, Tito had shown himself undisciplined, reluctant to put the interests of the USSR above those of Yugoslavia. He had been caught thinking for himself. He was not a Stalinist. This, indeed, was heresy. Not even his proven devotion to the cause of Communism could, in the eyes of the Kremlin, compensate for it.

##### 5. The Threat of Communist Nationalism


• THERE IS NO DOUBT that the existence of anti-Stalinist Communist movements greatly worries Moscow and acts as a brake to Soviet expansionism. These movements are thus of some importance to the West. In fact, Yugoslavia is rendering us now a service somewhat similar to that which she rendered us in 1941. The royalist coup in late March of that year, and the consequent swing in Yugoslavia's foreign policy to an anti-German line, forced Hitler to postpone the execution of "Plan Barbarossa" (the invasion of Russia) in order to first protect his rear by attacking Yugoslavia. This delay may well have saved the USSR, with the result that the Germans bled themselves white in the Russian campaign. Today, the Soviet Union is forced to tread more carefully than she ordinarily would because of Tito's Yugoslavia (and because of various dissident movements in Russia's Eastern European satellites). While it would thus be good policy for us to foster anti-Stalinism, one may well be of two minds when it comes to the question whether or not we should support anti-Stalinist Communism. Apart from the undisputable fact that the anti-Stalinist Communists are just as much bent on world revolution, and thus on the destruction of the democracies, as are the Stalinists, we must not overlook that Tito and the "Titoists" have introduced into the international Communist movement an idea which, for us, is wrought with great danger: Communist nationalism. We have seen that at the root of anti-Stalinism is the revulsion of the Frenchman or Italian who sees the French or the Italian Communist parties pursue policies which serve Russia rather than France or Italy. Thus, many a French Communist resigned from the Party when he saw French Communist leaders gloat over the economic damage done to France by the great mining strike of 1947. These French Communists well understood that when their leaders spoke of a strike which had brought to the miners only misery without any improvement of their working or living conditions, as a "victory," it was a Russian, not a French victory.



Tito (with Churchill in Naples, 1944) has been reluctant to put USSR's interests above Yugoslavia's.

Similarly, there will be many German Communists who will despair of Communism at the sight of a Pieck handing over to Poland, at Moscow's command, Germany's claim to close to 40,000 square miles of German lands. All over the world we see Communists who are eager to make Communist politics, but not Russian politics.

Communism and nationalism in one unholy union (as, for instance, in the USSR) would probably be much more difficult to combat than the combination of Communism and loyalty to the USSR. There are many reports that Communism has taken deeper roots in Yugoslavia since Tito broke with Stalin. The post-war surge of Communism came from the Communist resistance movements which were as militantly nationalist as they were red. In the Far East (where the Soviet Union ostensibly fosters nationalism) nationalist xenophobia has turned millions against the West, and may again turn millions against Moscow as soon as the latter should try and impose its rule after a nationalist-Communist revolution has succeeded. Thus, as a short-term policy, support of anti-Stalinist Communism may have something to recommend itself; in the long run, the Titos may prove themselves the more dangerous foes than even the Stalins. USMC



## Advice For The Replacement Pilot

by Capt. W. F. Simpson

• SO YOU'RE GOING OVERSEAS AS A REPLACEMENT fighter pilot. Brother, you have lots to learn. If you have combat experience dating from the last big fracas, you've gots lots to unlearn, for some of the principles are new and peculiar to this area.

The following are just a few tips we've picked up out here. Some of them we learned the hard way. Mostly, they concern close air support and targets of opportunity principles. We have no word for gunnery. We've had no air opposition—yet.

Before you get to your new squadron, make a strong attempt to get yourself squared away. Try to have a survival vest made up by your parachute department, or better yet get one of the ready made type from the Air Force. A good knee pad is essential and so is a certain sharpness on navigation—especially if you expect to be carrier based.

Maps of the approximate area your squadron is striking are nice things to have around too. Your new skipper will appreciate your preparedness and you yourself may have use for your gear sooner than you think. A strike hop, within an hour after reporting in, is not un-

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*The author, a replacement pilot himself, was killed in action in Korea.*

usual in the combat zone. And so, a word to the wise on preparedness—

Before your first hop, there are several bits of information peculiar to the combat zone that you must carry with you. For old combat pilots, this will be a refresher:

1. I.F.F.—Conventional with WW-II
2. Authenticator—Conventional with WW-II
3. Position of friendly and enemy lines marked on your map.
4. Frequencies of all channels on your knee pad. (This is essential due to the fact you will often be working with Army controllers who will be on frequencies on different radio channels from yours.)
5. Air-Sea Rescue and emergencies channels.
6. Controller channel (Army, Navy, Marine Corps).
7. Tactical channels.
8. Land, launch, and CAP channels (if carrier based).

A word about controllers. As you are well aware, this business of close air support depends largely on the smoothness of liaison with your controllers. They may be on the ground, in mobile vehicles, in OY's or AT-6 Army trainers. Before going anywhere, you'd better sit right down and refresh yourself on your controllers nets. As a preliminary confuser, you should know who the following characters are and where they fit in the controller picture:

1. AGC
2. TACC
3. FSCC
4. TACC (Ashore)
5. TACP

• FIRST LIEUTENANTS and some junior captains, who have been flying wing for many years had better refresh themselves too. Flights out in the combat zone adhere fairly strictly to RHIP on division and section leads, but most skippers keep in mind the possibility of the division leader being among those missing at evening chow. You might have the lead passed to you at anytime. Don't be so rusty that you embarrass yourself.

Some information tactics: As usual the radio nets will be crowded so make that important transmission brief and skip the rest. And, as usual, Joe Hotpilot from the other ship is just as eager to hit a target as you are. When you go after that tank, keep the noggin-head on a swivel. There may be a gull-wing coming around the other way. It's not at all unusual to have two simultaneous patterns of seven planes each working over front line positions within 15 miles of each other.

Which brings up something new. Upon recommendation of intelligence, we don't wear zipper flight suits out here. We fly in Army coveralls with pockets sewn in the knees, or Marine dungarees. It seems that zippers are

the trademark of American pilots, and American pilots are strictly lonesome polecats to Korean Commies. The point's more obvious if you get shot down.

And if you do get shot down behind enemy lines there are two words to remember. "Evade" and "Escape" in that order. That is try to hide first. Don't go charging down some railroad track like you-know-what on wheels. Get out of sight and play it cool. Surprisingly enough, there are many known friendly agents behind enemy lines. If they can, their underground will contact you and get you back to friendly lines. They will usually approach you singly and usually you can trust them.

Here's something we learned about the hard way: Front line support fire. Korean Commie ammo is like the Jap's. It is smokeless unless it is 40mm or something bigger. And so you never realize that whole platoons are lined up firing at you every time you seem overhead. We used to cruise around below a thousand feet looking for front line targets. We even put our flaps down to check positions and help those poor guys down below. Then suddenly they began to get the range and we lost a couple of planes. We fly higher now—and faster.

It is a good idea to make runs from different altitudes and directions with different angles of attack. Also try to avoid turning the Corsair belly to the enemy from too low an altitude. One little bullet in the oil cooler and you'd better wrap it up back to our side of the fence. We learned that the hard way too—and remember those guys don't like pilots—period.

• DON'T GET over exuberant and bend the go handle charging down too low with bombs and rockets. It's not just that you might get your dog tags separated, but we need the planes. We've had to patch up a few with bomb and rock fragments. And keep an eye on the terrain. It's more rugged than you might believe. You may think you are releasing above 1000 feet, but don't forget that the terrain above sea level and altimeter lag, and sometimes yonder hill is right where you want to pull out. Take it easy. Plan your pass, and don't release that ordnance until you are right on something good.

Incidentally, a little refresher on lead, angles of dive, speed, and release altitudes for rockets, bombs, and napals would be strictly in order before you report in.

Here's some info that squadron department heads may be interested in. Remember, it's only a guide. Your problem may be different from ours. And probably will.

S-1 Personnel—Your sergeant-major may lose his mind with this kind of duty—particularly if you are carrier based. It is not universal for a squadron to have personnel at four different bases at the same time, with a corporal doing nothing but shuffling in between. In addition to personnel on the flat-top, there may be a rear echelon with the Group Headquarters at the home base,



and often there will be mechs at some airfield used when the carrier is in part replenishing. Then your materiel department may have a rear echelon at main aviation supply located heaven knows where.

S-2 Intelligence—There's a shortage of maps as usual; pilots run through them fast. You can preserve yours somewhat by putting scotch tape on the more used parts of it. At interrogation, be truthful with S-2 and remember the cherry tree incident when you tell about the 20 railroad cars you blew off the track with one thousand-pounder.


S-4 Supply—Poor guy has problems. Everybody is on his neck. Logistic problems as usual are fantastic. Mostly, it's the usual manner of keeping an eye on what he has, and trying to get his share of everything else. Section B, aircraft engineering parts, and Section W, hard tools, are crucial. Be sure your squadron goes out with an up-to-date all awareness of each. Also overhaul your Sections K, P, R, O, and Marine Corps property before leaving the states. The squadron functions around S-4, and engineering depends on him. Be able to look the engineering officer in the eye instead of ducking behind the nearest bulkhead everytime he passes.

Your squadron doctor is an entirely different guy from the doc in the states. This guy is thinking about you and your health 24 hours a day. If you can't sleep, he has pills for you—a mild type. If you get to hanging over the bar too often on rest leave, he will speak to you about it. And, if you inadvertently over-imbibe the night before a hop, he will ground you. He's also a nice guy to know if you behave yourself. Doc hands out  $\frac{1}{8}$  ounce bottles of 100 proof brandy to the strike flights each evening before taps.

And last but not least have some consideration for your skipper. He's got the responsibility of leading strikes, the worries of the whole squadron on his back; the toughest load of all. There are office hours, administration problems to iron out, and general lessons to co-ordinate. He makes the squadron tick. Make his job easier. Just because you have 15 missions under your Mae West, you still don't rate getting three sheets to the wind every liberty night. Agreed that you rate relaxation but he rates consideration too. Moderation in all things. Do it the gentleman's way.

Good luck and good hunting in Korea or wherever you go. Believe you me, it's a bigger thrill than the time you beat up your older brother.

USMC



**Smoke generators at Anzio, used to blanket beachhead.**

• WHAT EFFECT WILL THE USE OF CUBIC MILES OF smoke employed in defense of advance naval bases have upon assault amphibious or airborne forces? Will the use of large area smoke screens employed in the defense of naval bases give the defender a better opportunity to withstand attack? If the answer is in the affirmative, then we must plan for the employment of such smoke operations in the defense of our bases; in addition, it may be feasible to re-examine our doctrines for amphibious operations and determine wherein these operations could be adversely affected by hostile employment of smoke.

A mission of the Marine Corps, as set forth by the National Security Act of 1947, is the defense of advance naval bases. Although this is not a mission to be taken lightly at any time, world conditions at present give added significance to this mission. Weapons have been developed which could possibly make any base untenable; however, this article is primarily concerned in pointing a way whereby Marines in a base defense situation can carry out their mission to a successful conclusion against hostile forces armed with orthodox weapons of war.

Since aggressiveness is the essence of the Marine Corps, this characteristic must be nurtured until it has an opportunity to actively engage the enemy. Certainly, it must not be depleted through attrition by enemy sea and air power before Marines on the ground have had an opportunity to engage the attacking forces, whether they be amphibious or airborne.

A study of Japanese base defense operations conducted during World War II reveals several factors which apparently adversely affected these operations. Perhaps an examination of these deficiencies, combined with a review of the experiences of our own troops in Europe in large area smoke screening operations can be of assistance in determining measures which, when applied to our own base defense doctrines and techniques, will aid us in overcoming some of the disadvantages faced by the defenders of advance naval bases.

# Smoke Means Survival

**By Maj Robert E. Collier**

It is evident to those who participated or to those who have studied the war in the Pacific that the Allied forces made one successful landing after another, all following a similar pattern—extensive aerial photographic reconnaissance followed by repeated aerial and naval attacks and, eventually, when the enemy was considered sufficiently “softened,” the movement ashore. It is interesting to note that in many instances with practically no air or naval support, sufficient enemy personnel survived these attacks to inflict severe casualties on the landing forces before being defeated themselves. Had these defending forces been able to keep the majority of their troops alive, supporting arms operating, materiel and supplies intact, and been able to move their reserves, obviously the outcome of the defense operations would have been considerably altered.

When local sea and air superiority passed from the Japanese to Allied hands during the attack of a base, the Japanese generally employed all the active and passive defense measures which are normal for this type of operation except barrage balloons and large area smoke screens. Invariably, active and passive measures of defense initiated by the Japanese against our air and naval attacks failed, and ground forces were subjected to terrific bombardment prior to attack by the landing force.

Apparently, the Japanese depended almost entirely on camouflage and fortifications for concealment and protection of their troops, materiel, and supplies. Camouflage of course is basic. Its use can go a long way towards deceiving the enemy; however, it can be penetrated by aerial photographic interpretation and can be destroyed by successive air and naval attacks. Fortifications are essential; however, they too are vulnerable to air and naval attack.

Since the Japanese were past masters in the art of camouflage and field fortifications, and since these measures were tried time after time with only partial success, they are obviously inadequate in situations involving defenses on a limited land mass. Perhaps if the Japanese

had been able to obscure vital areas from photographic reconnaissance and from air and naval attack requiring visual observation, passive measures such as camouflage and fortifications would have been more successful.

While the Japanese were conducting their unsuccessful defense operations in the Pacific, a device was in use in the European Theater of Operations, which undoubtedly would have enabled the Japanese to make a better showing. This device was the mechanical smoke generator. On numerous occasions smoke units equipped with these generators were able to assist troops accomplish their mission against great odds.

Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement was made during the defense of the Anzio beachhead. American troops were under continuous observation by the Germans from the mountains north and east of Anzio. This, together with the fact that German airmen were still contesting for air superiority, placed the Americans in a very difficult situation. The situation was relieved to a large degree by placing a smoke haze over the beachhead during daylight hours to distort and prevent terrestrial observation and observed artillery fire, and by using smoke blankets during air attacks to disrupt visual air bombardment. The use of smoke during the Anzio operation conserved life and supplies, and materially assisted in the break-out of the beachhead.

A study of the lessons learned in the Pacific in relation to base defense together with lessons learned through the employment of smoke in the ETO encourages the belief that the employment of smoke in large quantities during base defense operations will affect the defender favorably.

It is reasonable to assume that our base defense doctrines are sound and that the employment of smoke will result in no major change of these doctrines. As a matter of fact, the use of smoke should give the base commander wider latitude in exercising established base defense doctrines.

Generally speaking, smoke may be used during three phases of a base defense operation: (a) protection through obscuration of vital points, troops, supplies, and materiel from hostile visual and photographic air reconnaissance and air and naval attacks during preliminary operations against the base; (b) continued protection through obscuration of vital areas with emphasis on the protection of defensive installations including artillery position areas and rocket launching sites during prelanding operations of the attacking forces; (c) continued maximum protection to supporting arms, the obscuration of the movement of reserves and tank units, and the inclusion of the use of smoke in small unit operations.

It must be borne in mind that smoke must be used in mass in base defense operations; it is measured by the cubic mile and by the square mile. It is also apparent that the use of smoke is a passive means of protection

and must be accompanied by a maximum of active means of defense. With these considerations in mind let us get down to cases.

Essentially, the mission of a large area smoke screening in base defense operations is the passive protection through obscuration of vital points and areas, aviation facilities, defense installations, artillery position areas and rocket launching sites, port facilities, shipping, ammunition and supply dumps, motor pools and tank parks, troops, and convoys from enemy reconnaissance, precision bombing, naval gunfire, and the reduction of the effectiveness of hostile area bombardment.

The general picture of large area screening is relatively simple. Vital points are chosen in accordance with their relative importance and in accordance with the amount and type of smoke generating facilities available. Generators are so sited that the smoke will obscure the vital point in the most expeditious manner. Since smoke is controlled primarily by the wind, the generators must be operated in the sector from which the wind is blowing, hence, equipment must be mobile and control must be flexible if smoke operations are to be successful.

The primary and most effective means of generating smoke for large area operations is the mechanical smoke generator. Both the Army and the Navy have developed suitable generators for employment in base defense operations.

The M-2 Smoke Generator is probably the most flexible type available. This generator can be mounted on a  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck or trailer, in small craft or on the ground. It can be operated while the vehicle or boat is in operation. Forty-eight of these generators manned by a company of some 150 men can obscure an area approximately 2 to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles by 8 to 15 miles, depending on weather and terrain conditions. Chemically filled smoke pots may be used to initiate screens quickly, build up small screens, thicken existing screens, and provide protection for mechanical smoke generators.

**Smoke screen, constant during daylight hours at Anzio.**



Perhaps an illustrative problem involving the employment of smoke troops in a hypothetical base defense situation will be of value in understanding the vital role such units can play in base defense operations of the future.

In view of unstable world conditions and probable enemy attack, the Fourth Smoke Battalion, which consists of a Headquarters and Service Company and two generator companies, has been assigned to X Base. Upon debarkation at X Base, LtCol Fogg, the commanding officer, reported to the Base Commander. He was informed that in addition to his regular duties as battalion commander, his duties included that of smoke officer on the Base Commander's staff.

IN HIS CAPACITY as Base Smoke Officer, LtCol Fogg prepares the Smoke Plan Annex to the plan of defense for the base. After he completes an estimate of the situation which is based on a study of the prevailing meteorological conditions, the terrain, and the smoke generating facilities available, LtCol Fogg recommends that all smoke generating facilities operate under a control center and that prior to any attempted landing by hostile forces this agency function under the control of Base Operations. He further lists vital points and areas which could be screened successfully by the generating facilities available.

The recommendations of LtCol Fogg are incorporated in the Smoke Plan and steps are taken immediately to effect the plan. Generator sites are selected, roads to these sites prepared, and camouflaged bomb-resistant emplacements constructed. LtCol Fogg is aware that the first enemy attack will probably come in the form of aerial photographic reconnaissance; therefore he orders a twenty-four hour watch maintained in order to "make smoke" whenever unidentified aircraft approach the base. In addition, he conducts tests to determine the correct placement of generators under various meteorological conditions, and coordinates the employment of smoke with antiaircraft and air operations.

Meanwhile, conferences are held with the Commander, Ground Defense, pertaining to the employment of large area smoke screens in event of hostile landings. The Smoke Plan Annex of the Ground Defense Plan as approved by the Commander, X Base, provides for the shift of control of all land based smoke generating facilities to the Commander, Ground Defense, on order. The Smoke Plan further provides for the smoking of troop concentrations, artillery position areas, tank dispersal areas, and routes of approach which will be used by reserves and by tank units.

After the first air attack, which was only partially successful since enemy bombers were unable to see their targets and had to rely on electronic devices and conduct area bombing, the tempo of the attack increased.

At each air raid warning, smoke generators began mak-

ing smoke, and by the time bombers were over the target area vital points and areas were obscured. Frequently dummy screens were used to deceive the enemy as to the location of vital points. During each raid airstrips were obscured by smoke as soon as friendly aircraft cleared the field, thus conserving these strips for future use. Heavy AA was fired by radar while light AA was placed clear of the smoke screens in order that visual control of fire could be obtained. Artillery positions were camouflaged and screened by smoke in order that they could not be located by aerial photographic interpretation.

Eventually, the enemy gained air and naval superiority in the area surrounding X Base, and air and naval attacks became quite frequent. It was apparent, however, that the smoke operations were important inasmuch as air and naval attacks failed to knock out vital defensive areas, weapons positions, and troop concentrations. Upon sighting a convoy of troop ships, control of the Smoke Battalion was shifted to the Commander, Ground Forces.

During the landing phase defense forces were able to utilize their artillery, since position areas were obscured by smoke. Observation of fires on the beaches was possible part of the time since friendly observation was denied at times by hostile smoke. Routes of approach for tanks were smoked immediately after troops commenced landing and hostile forces were hit by a strong armored attack shortly thereafter.

WHO WON the battle? That is a question that must remain unanswered until a series of these operations has been conducted. It seems plausible, however, that a tactical victory for the attacker by weight of numbers would be possible with an accompanying strategic defeat through heavy cost.

Admittedly, the above example of the employment of large area smoke screening in the defense of an advance naval base is over exaggerated. It may seem that the control of smoke, since it is a free agent once released, could be so difficult that the uncertainty of its effect would preclude its employment in this type operation. However, when viewing the fate of most bases in the past war, one is either forced to take a defeatist attitude and suffer the fate that certainly seems to be waiting, or seek out developments which will give the defender an opportunity to divorce himself from his brother, the sitting duck. Current base defense doctrine can be propounded until school is out, but success insofar as ground forces are concerned can only be achieved if the commander is permitted to carry these doctrines into effect.

The base commander must conserve his men and materiel until they can be most effectively employed at a critical time and place against the attacker. It is believed that large area smoke screening can go a long way toward assisting the commander achieve this goal.

USMC

## Korea Awards

*The awards listed on this page arrived from Headquarters, USMC, after the GAZETTE had gone to press.*

### **Legion of Merit:**

LtCol Ranson M. Wood.

### **Silver Star:**

2dLt Nickolas D. Arkadis, Capt Victor A. Armstrong, Capt Robert R. Barrow, Sgt John F. Boyce, 2dLt Ray N. Carter, TSgt Angelo P. Ciampa, SSgt Charles L. Daniels, SSgt Saveren J. Dennis, Sgt John A. Fighter, 2dLt Howard O. Foor, PFC Rudy G. Garcia, PFC Robert R. Gomez, PFC William A. Helgeson, Jr., Capt Samuel Jaskilka, Cpl David C. Jenkins, Cpl Marion E. Jones, PFC Virginio Lepore, Jr., PFC Billy D. Lindley, Sgt John N. Malner, PFC James P. McGinnis, TSgt Orval F. McMullen, PFC Melvin J. Musialowski, Sgt Harvey B. Owen, Sgt Arnold A. Perri, PFC Arturo Quiroz, Sgt Harold W. Rowland, Maj Edwin H. Simmons, TSgt Max Stein, PFC Daniel J. Sullivan, 2dLt Carl B. Thompson, Jr., PFC William R. Tipton, Sgt Fred W. P. Webber, PFC Fred L. Walz, Cpl Billy D. Webb, Capt Bruce F. Williams, 2dLt Robert M. Winter (two awards), TSgt Lewis C Wroblewski, and PFC Mario E. Yedlowski.

### **Distinguished Flying Cross:**

1stLt Thomas R. Braun.

### **Bronze Star:**

PFC Anthony C. Belpulsi, PFC Allyn R. Bennett, Capt James D. Boldman, Cpl Benjamin A. Boyer, PFC Thomas B. Boylan, 2dLt Richard E. Carey, PFC John J. Casey, Jr., Capt Gildo S. Codispoti, Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr., 2dLt Lamar G. Crawford, PFC Ralph G. Daily, SSgt Charles L. Daniels, Cpl Alfred W. Davis, 2dLt Richard M. Doezena, 1stLt George C. Fox, Capt Donald R. France, Capt Goodwin C. Groff, SSgt Edward J. Hanrahan, 2dLt Lee R. Howard, MSgt Edward L. Kirkpatrick, SSgt Pasquale A. Maniero, PFC Paul C. McKeown, SSgt Stanley B. McPherson, Cpl Charles Newell, 2dLt Peter C. Osterhoudt, PFC Vincent Panzero, Cpl Gerald G. Pendas, Jr., SSgt Manuel Perez, 1stLt William J. Peter, Jr., Sgt William G. Pearch, 1stLt William D. Pomeroy, Cpl Norman D. Revell, PFC George W. Sagle, Capt Victor E. Sellers, PFC Benjamin C. Simpson, Jr., Cpl John N. Sjursen, SSgt Richard D. Smith, Capt Norman R. Stanford, LtCol Alan Sutter, PFC Walter A. Taubert, PFC Howard Wells, and PFC William L. Wilson.

2dLt Nickolas D. Arkadis, Cpl William T. Buckley, Cpl Walter L. Carrow, PFC William R. Davis, PFC Ross De Simone, Cpl Martin Garcia, PFC Harry C. Jones, Sgt Albert W. Keller, PFC Robert L. Morrow, Cpl Charles P. Roche,

Capt John L. Tobin, Cpl Donald W. Willard, MSgt Thomas T. Wood, MSgt Leonard R. Young, and Cpl James M. Zimmerle.


### **Commendation Ribbon:**

MSgt William J. Addis, Capt Charles M. Cable, Cpl John L. David, Sgt Vernon A. Faulstick, Capt John P. Grove, 1stLt James M. McGee, Sgt Gene F. Moran, SSgt Augustine H. Oberg, 2dLt James P. O'Connell, MSgt Earl W. Pence, PFC George Polman, Capt Augustine B. Reynolds, 2dLt Kenneth R. Stewart, Cpt James A. Sullivan, and 2dLt Granville G. Sweet.

### **Air Medal:**

1stLt Charles W. Abrahams, Maj William D. Armstrong (5th), Capt Irvin J. Barney (5th), Capt James P. Bell, 1stLt Henry A. Berck (5th), 1stLt Warren J. Beyes, Capt Charles E. Boswell, Jr., 1stLt Thomas R. Braun (5th, 6th, and 7th), TSgt Lloyd B. Britt (3rd), 1stLt William W. Bryant (5th), Capt James M. Burris (7th), LtCol Arthur A. Chidester, Maj Robert L. Cochran, 1stLt Joseph B. Dehaven, Capt Lawrence R. Denham (10th), 1stLt Donald H. Edwards (8th), Capt Charles W. Egan (4th), Maj Harold A. Eisele (12th), 1stLt Lloyd J. Engelhardt (4th), Capt George B. Farish (2d), Capt Kenneth G. Fiegener, Capt Floyd K. Fulton, Jr. (10th), 2dLt Edgar F. Gaudette, Jr. (9th), Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk (3rd), 1stLt David P. Graf, Capt Albert A. Grasselli, 1stLt Neal E. Heffernan, Maj Richard Hey, Jr. (7th), TSgt Robert A. Hill (2d and 3rd), Capt Harding H. Holloway, TSgt John W. Hutton, Capt Roy J. Irwin (4th), MSgt Donald A. Ives.

Capt Richard W. Johnson (6th), 1stLt Paul D. King, 1stLt Wendell M. Larson (5th), 1stLt Gustave A. Limbach, 1stLt James P. Mariades (2d and 3rd), 2dLt Billy C. Marks (11th and 12th), MSgt James A. Mayhew (4th), Capt Alden McBarron (10th), Capt Robert E. McClean (2d), Capt Grover C. McClure (5th), 1stLt Herbert E. Mendenhall, 1stLt Richard R. Miller, 1stLt Eugent Millette (2d and 3rd), 1stLt Thomas E. Mulvihill (5th), 1stLt John J. Murphey, 1stLt Max Nebergall (2d and 3rd), Capt Russell G. Patterson, Jr., Capt James Payette, MSgt Norman E. Payne, Jr., Capt Vernon J. Peebles, 2dLt Dock H. Pegues, TSgt William W. Poore, TSgt Charley L. Radford, 1stLt Charles I. Rice, Jr., TSgt Paul H. Sallade, MajGen Oliver P. Smith, Col Edward W. Sneedker, Capt David G. Swinford (3rd), Maj Elmer P. Thompson (6th), Capt Jack H. Wilkinson, Capt Lynn F. Williams (2d), and 1stLt Robert H. Wilson.



# The Federals and Ft. Fisher

## PART II

By Maj Edwin H. Simmons

BY THE DAY AFTER CHRISTMAS, UNCONFIRMED rumors of the failure of the first expedition against Fort Fisher began to reach Washington. On the 29th, Lt Preston, the same who did so bravely if futilely with the powder ship, arrived to deliver Porter's official report to Gideon Welles on the fiasco.

Welles called in Fox and the two went immediately to the President with the dispatches. Lincoln read them carefully, said there was nothing in the Navy's performance to criticize; as for the Army, "I must refer you to Gen Grant."

Back in their offices, Welles and Fox drafted a dispatch to Grant's field headquarters at City Point, Virginia. Fox thought they should deliberately avoid channeling it through Stanton and suggested telegraphing the message directly to Grant. With some misgivings Welles agreed.

By Saturday, the 31st, they had Grant's telegraphed reply. Characteristically and vigorously, Grant said that he would organize another expedition immediately and secretly, and get it off with sealed orders by Monday, Tuesday at the latest. Surprisingly enough, Stanton received news of this behind-his-back arrangement cheerfully—as long as Grant was in agreement, so was Stanton.

Meanwhile, Butler, politically still potent, knew his fat was in the fire. He had his public relations man, Editor Clark of the *Norfolk Regime*, publish an article full of justification. Other anti-administration papers rallied to Butler's defense including Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune*. The gist of Butlers' argument was that Fort Fisher couldn't be taken by assault.

On January 2, 1865, a series of concise, not apparently related, messages left City Point over the signature "U. S. Grant."

One to Gen Butler suggested tartly that Weitzel be given 30 days' leave.

A second, via Secretary of War Stanton, ordered Gen Sheridan at Winchester to detach a division and send it to Baltimore. Phil Sheridan received his order 9 o'clock that night and had a division ready at the depot by 10 the next morning. (The trains were late.)

A third dispatch ordered MajGen Alfred H. Terry, commanding the 24th Army Corps, to report immediately

**Breaching the scattered defenses, BrigGen N. Martin Curtis' brigade, part of the 2d Division, 24th Army Corps under BrigGen Adelbert Ames, headed the assault**

**SYNOPSIS:** When Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles initiated an amphibious assault on heavily defended Fort Fisher, sentinel of the South's last remaining outlet for foreign trade, he picked pompous Gen Benjamin F. Butler as expeditionary troops commander. Butler, politician but not soldier, failed to make proper use of naval gunfire, once ashore faltered and withdrew his troops prematurely. Butler felt that the fort was impregnable to sea attack. Adm David D. Porter, fleet commander, was not of the same mind. Porter was anxious to try again.



to Gen Grant in person at City Point. Terry, a good man in a fight, arrived at Grant's headquarters that day to learn that he was to command a second expedition against Fisher.

Just before midnight, Ames' and Paine's divisions were pulled out of the lines and their generals directed to report at 9 a.m. to Terry.

On the 3rd, Grant sent one of his brief reports to Stanton:

"The expedition against Wilmington will commence their embarkation to-morrow morning, and, if the weather will permit going to sea, will be with Adm Porter on Friday. Here there is not the slightest suspicion where the troops are going. The orders to officers commanding enjoin secrecy, and designate Savannah, and to report to Sherman at their destination."

And in a letter to Porter dispatched the same day, Grant begins, "I send Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry, with the same troops Gen Butler had, with one picked brigade added, to renew the attempt on Fort Fisher. In addition to this I have ordered Gen Sheridan to send a division of infantry to Baltimore to be put on sea-going transports, so they can go also if their services are found necessary." These troops were to be held at Fort Monroe, ready to sail at an hour's notice.

Not bad, in something less than four days Grant had put together an amphibious landing force including provision for a floating reserve.

Between Butler and Porter there had not even been positive liaison, but now Grant stated the command rela-



tionship for the second expedition quite definitely to Porter: "General Terry will consult with you fully, and will be governed by your suggestions as far as his responsibility for the safety of his command will admit of."

In the meantime, Porter had pulled his fleet back to Beaufort for coaling, refitting, and resupply, leaving just the regular blockaders to watch Cape Fear. Porter, with no way of knowing what Washington was planning, wrote to his old friend of the Western campaigns, William T. Sherman, who had just completed his march from Atlanta to the sea. Porter wanted troops sent to him by transport. Instead, Sherman replied that as he was coming north anyway, he would march through the Carolinas to Wilmington "tearing up the roads and smashing things generally" and take the city from the rear.

Sherman's letter was written on the last day of the old year; Porter received it on the 3rd. By this time he knew of the second expedition being mounted by Grant and could wish Sherman Godspeed on his land campaign. It was just as well, he wrote, that Butler had failed, "Had he succeeded it would have made him our next President, the greatest calamity that could have happened to the country."

Butler, as yet, wasn't completely out of the picture. On that same busy 3rd of January, he had filed his official report covering the first expedition. Grant forwarded it on the 7th with a blistering endorsement enclosing substantiating dispatches showing that he had never intended that Butler should have had charge of the expedition. Even earlier, on the 6th, he telegraphed Lincoln requesting that Butler be removed from command of the Army of the James. Lincoln agreed and in the first general order for the new year, the Adjutant-General's Office directed that "Major-General Butler, on being relieved, will repair to Lowell, Mass., and report by letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army."

Butler was a bitter-ender; he asked that his report be made public, and on January 8th published a maudlin farewell to his command: ". . . I have refused to order

the useless sacrifice of the lives of such soldiers, and I am relieved of your command. The wasted blood of my men does not stain my garments. . . ."

Meanwhile, Gen Terry was at Bermuda Landing, Va. Embarkation began at sunset on the 4th and was completed by noon of the next day. Each ship as it was loaded was dispatched to Fortress Monroe, the whole fleet collected at Hampton Roads, and underway at 4 a.m. the next morning. Each soldier was in heavy marching order, had his four days' rations and 40 rounds of ammunition in his cartridge box. Grant came down personally to see them loaded out.

As a second echelon there was a siege train embarked of 20 30-pound Parrots, four 100-pounder Parrots, and 20 Coehorn mortars, with a detail of 500 artillerymen and a company of engineers. This siege train, under BrigGen Henry L. Abbot, was to follow the assault echelon as far as Beaufort and would be called up and landed if needed.

This was Terry's troop list for the assault echelon:

Command	Officers	Men
General Headquarters	12	12
2d Division, 24th Army Corps (Ames)	192	3,787
3d Division, 25th Army Corps (Paine)	160	3,149
2d Brigade, 1st Division, 24th Army Corps (Abbott)	65	1,385
16th New York Independent Battery (Lee)	3	42*
Light Company E, 3d U. S. Artillery (Myrick)	4	55**
Detachment, Signal Corps (Beardslee)	4	27
Total Present for Duty	440	8,457

\* Four 3-inch guns.

\*\* Six light 12-pounders.

Bad weather set in on the 6th. The ships in the transport squadron were separated, but each, by now had broken the seals on its secret orders and knew that the rendezvous was set for a point 25 miles off Beaufort, North Carolina. Terry in the flag transport reached the rendezvous early on the 8th. The other ships came straggling in, showing some storm damage but apparently intact. Terry left BrigGen Adelbert Ames in charge while he went into Beaufort to see Porter.

Porter and Terry compared and consolidated their plans and waited for a break in the weather. Heavy seas continued to run from the southwest and they did not get away until the 12th. As the combined attack and transport squadrons steamed out from Beaufort on the morning tide, Abbot's siege train came into sight, and, to prevent possible further delay, was ordered to follow. The fleet proceeded in three columns and by afternoon was in the objective area. Porter hoped to get the troops ashore that evening and night but the surf was still too high.

At 4 a.m. the next morning, January 13th, the transports and naval gunfire support ships formed up for the landing. Porter's organization into three lines and a reserve was essentially the same as for the Christmas attack. Before daylight Line No. 1 took station 600 yards out from the landing beach. The transports were in posi-

tion generally parallel to Line No 1 and 200 yards further seaward. Lines 2 and 3 were close to and outside the transport area. In addition to his own surf boats Terry had 200 small craft plus a number of steam tugs furnished by Porter. Landing hour was set for 8 a.m.

Meanwhile, Porter has sent his iron ships under Commodore William Radford down to engage the north face of the fort. The *New Ironsides* and the monitors *Saugus*, *Canonicus*, *Mahopac*, and *Monadnock* opened fire at 1000 yards. The fort replied with its heavy guns. The duel was lively but the fort's guns were soon beaten down.

There was nothing shilly-shally about Terry's landing. He commenced promptly at 8 a.m.; troops, provisions, tools, and ammunition going ashore simultaneously. He threw out his pickets immediately. They faced a few scattered shots from rebel outposts but no serious resistance. A few prisoners were taken and identified as from Hoke's division.

The surf was still quite high, the troops coming ashore got wet, some rations and ammunition were damaged, but the weather was pleasant and the landing itself proceeded without incident. By 3 p.m. Terry had 8,000 men ashore, each with three days' rations and 40 rounds, plus bulk stores of six days' hard bread, 300,000 rounds small arms, and a sufficient number of entrenching tools.

Terry's first objective was to throw a strong defensive line, facing Wilmington, across the peninsula, to protect his rear from attack while he operated against Fort Fisher. From a map study he had selected what looked like a naturally strong defensive position (Myrtle Sound and Masonborough Inlet narrowed the sand spit to little more than 100 yards in width) and had chosen his landing place accordingly. But on landing he found the Sound to be too shallow to have any value as an obstacle.


Accordingly, he picked out a line farther down, about three miles from the fort, where his map showed a pond occupying about a third of the width of the peninsula. He began to shift his troops shortly after 5 p.m. The "pond" turned out

to be a sand flat sometimes covered with water, again no obstacle, but Terry was determined to organize the line.

HE PASSED PAINE'S DIVISION, followed by two of Ames' brigades, through his reconnaissance elements. Paine reached Cape Fear River at 9 p.m. and Terry had a solid line of troops sealing off the peninsula. Further reconnaissance showed a still better defensive line closer to the fort. The troops were again sent forward and a line occupied two miles from the forbidding north face of the fort. The time was now 2 a.m. Tools were brought up and the troops began to dig in.

Meanwhile, Porter was not idle. With the troops safely ashore, he had shifted Lines 1 and 2 southward to augment the ironclads' attack. Line 3 remained in position to cover the landing beach and to get the field artillery ashore. Lines 1 and 2 took station and pounded away until after dark when the wooden ships withdrew. The iron ships remained in position and continued to fire throughout the night.

Porter was determined there would be no heavy guns left to hinder the Army's assault. When morning came on the 13th, he sent in his shallow draft gunboats mounting



11-inch guns to fire slowly and dismount the remaining guns.

Morning also found Terry's force behind a thoroughly respectable breastwork (facing north) thrown up during the last hours of darkness. Terry's first action was to push forward BrigGen N. Martin Curtis' brigade of Ames' division to feel out the front. Curtis' New Yorkers reached the outworks of Fisher, about 600 yards from the parapet. Terry went forward to join them and take a careful look at the land face.

As a result of his reconnaissance, Terry decided to assault the next day without landing his siege train (which promised to be a difficult operation over an open beach with a rough surf), providing the log palisade could be breached by naval gunfire. He communicated with Porter and Porter promptly put a division of vessels to the task.

[Thanks to 2dLt William W. Clemens, U. S. Signal Corps, detailed to Porter as signal officer, at least one regular officer on each ship understood the Army code and Porter openly marveled that "we could converse at our pleasure, though nearly a mile apart and amidst the din of battle."]

During the day, Terry's 10 pieces of light artillery were landed and toward sunset he placed them on his right flank, the river side, where naval gunfire could do him the least good.

That evening Terry went aboard Porter's flagship *Malvern* to coordinate the next day's attack. After careful discussion it was arranged that a heavy bombardment would begin in the morning, to continue until Terry signaled the assault when it would lift from the point of attack to other parts of the fort. The general scheme of maneuver was to send the Army against the western half of the land face, while a column of sailors and marines stormed the northeast bastion where the land and sea faces joined. Details settled, Terry went ashore. Navy fire continued all that night.

At 8 a.m. the morning of the 15th, Terry was gratified to see Porter's ships in position and a shore bombardment that was "magnificent alike for its power and accuracy, was opened." Ames' division had been selected for the assault. His 1st Brigade under Curtis was already in position, having dug in at the line of outworks reached the day before. BrigGen Paine with his two colored brigades plus Col Joseph C. Abbott's brigade of New Englanders was left in command of the defensive line—the counterpart of a force beachhead line—previously prepared.



Meanwhile Porter was hammering the fort with his big naval shellguns. His plan was essentially the same, except for refinements and more specific fire missions, as that used for the Christmas preparations. In spite of the repeated pounding they had received, some of the rebel guns still managed to return fire—two heavy guns in Mound Battery at the far south end of the fortification gave him particular trouble.

Porter expected Terry's "change direction of fire" signal at 2 p.m. But, although the Army attack was developing smoothly, Terry was not quite ready. At 2 p.m., 100 volunteer sharpshooters armed with shovels and Spencer repeating carbines were sent forward at a run by Curtis. They got to within 175 yards of the parapet, dug rifle pits in the loose sand, and opened fire against the fort. The Confederates answered with artillery and musketry.

While this lively fire fight was going on, Curtis advanced his brigade by regiments (he had four) until he was within 475 yards of the objective. More rifle pits were dug. Ames' 2d Brigade, two New York regiments and three from Pennsylvania, under Col Galusha Pennybaker, went forward now and occupied the 1st Brigade's vacated line. Col Louis Bell's 3d Brigade (one Indiana, one New Hampshire, and two New York regiments) moved up to a position 200 yards behind Pennybaker.

Curtis now advanced to a good covered position on a slight reverse slope about 50 yards behind his line of sharpshooters. Accordingly, Pennybaker moved into Curtis' old line of rifle pits, and Bell took Curtis' former position. The whole division was advancing, in echelons of regiments and brigades, in what was a beautiful demonstration of fire and movement.

Assault parties to breach the log palisade had been formed of volunteer axmen and demolition teams with bags of powder. The palisade was thoroughly blasted by naval gunfire and the powder wasn't needed, but the axmen did yeoman service in clearing lanes through the splintered logs.

At 3:25, everything was completed, the order was given for Ames to assault and for Porter to lift his fires. Out in the fleet, all steam whistles were blown, the gunners shifted to new targets, and all hands not blinded by smoke watched the blue figures ashore dash for the fort.

Curtis' brigade with magnificent spirit charged through galling enfilade fire toward the parapet. Meanwhile the Navy column had reached but was not able to take the northeast bastion.

As early as January 4th, Porter had foreseen the need for a naval landing force and had issued plans for its employment. In a most business-like way he stated that each ship's commander would detail as many men as could be spared from the guns to a landing party. He estimated that 2,000 men could be put ashore without feeling it—1,600 seamen and 400 marines. Boats were to be lowered on the off-side of the vessels. Two boat

keepers were to be detailed to each boat. So far, so good. It is when he got into the tactical employment that his plan fell apart. His sailors were to be armed with "well-sharpened" cutlasses and revolvers and were to "board the fort on the run in a seaman-like way." The marines were to form in the rear and cover the sailors with their muskets.

The final orders—issued a little late, distribution wasn't completed until *after* the landing party was ashore—were even worse. The boats were to beach outside of gunshot, unload as fast as possible and shove off. The landing force then was to form up, the marines by themselves and the sailors apparently altogether. The brave and ubiquitous Lt Preston was to take a party of sappers forward with shovels and throw up rifle pits as close to the fort as possible. These were to be occupied by marines while the sailors assaulted in three lines. The plan, then, in all essentials paralleled Terry's scheme of maneuver. But Porter made no provision for organization, rehearsal, or proper weapons. Practically none of his men or officers had had any experience in land operations. The "fleet captain," a staff officer and only a lieutenant commander, was to take charge of the landing party.

The signal to land the landing party was made about 10 a.m. The boats got away from their ships about 11 and by noon the whole force was on the beach about a mile and a half above Fort Fisher. LtCmdr James Parker, senior officer present, began to sort out the heterogeneous force. Then "Fleet Captain" LtCmdr K. Randolph Breese came up with Porter's landing orders, and Parker, although senior, deferred to him.

Four lines were organized as follows:

- 1st Line—400 marines, Capt Lucien L. Dawson, USMC.
- 2d Line—Seamen from the 1st and 4th divisions of the squadron, LtCmdr Charles H. Cushman.
- 3d Line—Seamen from the 2d division, LtCmdr James Parker.
- 4th Line—Seamen from the 3d Division, LtCmdr Thomas O. Selfridge.

Each of the three Navy lines were of about equal strength. They were further organized into companies, and sergeants and corporals were tolled off—all of this being done on the beach.

Preston took his party of sappers out. They secured a line about 600 yards from the fort and then gradually advanced it to within 200 yards. As fast as positions were prepared they were occupied by a detail of marines under 2dLt Louis E. Fagan.

Meanwhile, the main body (which intended attacking with three lines of sailors) wasn't ready when the Army attack jumped off. Stampeded by the Army's advance, the three lines converged into a single dense column and hurried down the beach. Dawson's marines were not in position to support their assault.

At the angle formed by the joining of the land and sea forces the Navy leaders halted to allow the rear to join up. There was crowding and confusion. The Confederates poured effective rifle fire into them from 40 yards. An effort was made to charge through the gaps torn in the palisade. A party, under LtCmdr William B. Cushing, a daredevil with considerable amphibious experience, actually reached the walls. But their position could not be sustained. The column began to fall back in considerable panic. The wounded were left on the beach. Some lay flat on the sand pretending to be dead until darkness allowed escape. Brave Preston was among those killed.

Both Porter and Breese were quick to blame the marines for the failure of the assault, but this is a poor cloak for their own ignorance. Dawson, in justification, attempted to show that he was still organizing his "battalion" (about 365 marines, exclusive of Fagan's detachment) into companies when Breese began to hurry him along and that the sailors, carried away by commendable but horribly misdirected enthusiasm, charged prematurely.

THE ARMY'S ATTACK, fortunately, was proceeding according to plan. Pennybaker and Bell had each moved

up one line when Curtis made his assault. Terry now committed Pennybaker's brigade in support of Curtis, overlapping his advance on the right. Next, Bell's brigade with sent in to fill the gap from Pennybaker's flank to the river. Heavy hand-to-hand fighting secured the west or river end of the parapet including nine of the Rebel gun traverses. Terry now began to roll up the Confederate defenses closely supported by Porter's iron-



clads. At times Porter was delivering fires within 50 yards of the advancing Federals. (This phenomenally close support can be explained by three factors: first, the naval gunfire ships were in the ideal position of firing at right angles to the axis of the Federal advance so that errors in range did not endanger the friendly troops greatly; second, Civil War shells although potent, did not have the lethal radius of today's projectiles; third, the Confederate system of traverses and lateral fortifications formed compartments which protected not only the defenders but the attackers as well.)

To reconstitute his local reserve, Terry ordered Paine to send him Abbott's brigade (to be placed on the defensive line by such of the sailors and marines as could be reorganized) and one of his strongest Negro regiments. Abbott's brigade was committed at 6 p.m. The 27th U.S. Colored Troops under Brig Gen Albert M. Blackman was held to the rear.

Terry himself was in the fort directing the fighting. The Union troops, having taken the land face, moved down the sea face, traverse by traverse, until Mound Battery was taken.

With darkness, Porter had to shift his fires from the fort proper to the beach between Fisher and Buchanan where it was thought the Rebels might attempt a counter-landing reinforcement on the river side. Terry signaled Fort Fisher secured at 9 p.m. He now sent Abbott's brigade plus the 27th U.S. Colored Troops down the point to Battery Buchanan to which many of the defenders had withdrawn. Here they cleaned up all of the enemy not previously captured, including Whiting and Lamb, both wounded.

• ESSENTIALLY, this was the end of the operation. At 4 p.m. Hoke had advanced his division against Paine's north line, but did not press his attack after a brief skirmish with Union pickets. To support Paine, Dawson had succeeded in reorganizing about 180 of his marines. A like number of sailors, largely due to the exertions of Cushing, were also rallied. The siege train under Abbot had been landed during the day in case it would be needed against Fisher or subsequent fortified positions.

As soon as he could find time to count his spoils and take a muster, Terry could report the capture of 169 guns, 2,000 stand of small arms, considerable commissary stores and ammunition, and prisoners totalling 112 officers and 1,971 enlisted men.

His own casualties were almost entirely confined to the assaulting echelons of Ames' 2d Division and totalled 110 killed, 536 wounded, and 13 missing. Bell was dead. Curtis and Pennybaker, both badly wounded, would live and receive Medals of Honor.

No very good estimate of Confederate casualties can be made except for the prisoners. Some few undoubtedly escaped across the river, but Porter figured that 400 were

either killed or wounded. Porter's own casualties, mostly incurred during the unhappy assault but including those received from the explosion of a magazine in Fort Fisher subsequent to its capture, totalled 88 killed, 271 wounded, and 34 missing.

In his report Porter estimated that his fleet had "expended in the bombardment about 50,000 shells . . ." Compilers can account for 20,271 projectiles weighing 1,275,299 pounds in the first attack, 19,682 weighing 1,652,638 pounds in the second attack, and estimate these totals to be 90 to 95 per cent complete. Taking the length of the fort as 2,580 yards this yields a ratio of well over 1,000 pounds of metal and explosive for every linear yard.


Bragg and Whiting had had their first warning of the new attack on the 12th. Whiting went immediately to Fort Fisher where Lamb had about 1,800 men. Bragg directed Hoke, with about 6,000 effectives including cavalry and reserves, to take position on the peninsula north of the fort in order to watch for the enemy and confront him with a counterattack. Bragg, who joined Hoke at his headquarters at Sugar Loaf on the afternoon of the 13th, gives two reasons for Hoke's failure to attack Terry on the beaches. First, swamp and water limited his maneuver room. Second, the fleet threatened an awesome weight of metal. So Hoke, with Bragg endorsing his decision, did nothing that afternoon and night.

• THE NEXT MORNING, reconnaissance showed that Terry had out-maneuvered them and occupied the defensive line previously described. Bragg ordered Hoke to attack, but the position looked too strong and the order was suspended.

Within the fort, Whiting was bitter that Terry had been allowed to land without interference and further permitted to divide the Confederate forces with what Whiting considered a light line of fieldworks. He thought, and probably rightly, that the mobile reserve should have been under his command. In which case he would have had no business immobilizing himself in the fort.

At 1:30 p.m. on the 14th Whiting telegraphed Bragg for reinforcements. That night 1100 veteran infantry were sent down the river by steamer, but the steamer went aground and only 500 reached the fort. Nevertheless, Bragg thought that a force of 2,300 should be sufficient to secure the fort from attack. As he saw it, all the fort had to do was to resist assault and with the first bad weather the fleet must withdraw leaving Terry's force, ashore without artillery or cavalry, easy prey to Hoke.

The next day at 1:30 p.m. Whiting reported by telegraph that he had lost only 3 killed and 32 wounded. An hour later he telegraphed that the assault had begun. Hoke's division was immediately formed for an attack against Paine's line, but after the first feeble probings the attack faltered. The excuse this time was that Bragg and Hoke, learning of the repulse of the Navy landing force,



thought the Federal assault had failed.

When the Navy assault came, the greater part of the Fort Fisher force was shifted to the right to meet them, weakening the left and making the job there easier for Terry's three assault brigades. At 4 p.m. Whiting, leading personally a counterattack against Terry's foothold, was severely wounded. Half an hour later Lamb was also hit.

At 7:30 that evening Bragg received the following message:

"Gen Braxton Bragg:

The enemy are assaulting us by land and sea. Their infantry outnumbers us. Can't you help us? I am slightly wounded.

WHITING,  
General."

BrigGen Alfred H. Colquitt was ordered by Bragg to proceed to Fort Fisher and take immediate command. Colquitt found a rowboat and with his personal staff but with no troops started down the river. He landed near Battery Buchanan something after 9 p.m., found it deserted by its naval garrison and filled with demoralized and disorganized Confederates ready to surrender. Gen Whiting and Col Lamb had been carried back to the battery by a squad of Marines. Whiting was dismayed that Colquitt had brought no plans for their evacuation, that there were no boats available and they were to be abandoned. There was nothing Colquitt could do except take his staff back to his rowboat, row upstream, and report the calamity to Bragg.

Whiting, as a prisoner of war, was sent to Fort Columbus, Governor's Island, New York. He died as a result of his wounds on March 10, 1865, and until his death he blamed the capture of Fort Fisher on Bragg's timidity. But he also credited high the role of naval gunfire. In an endorsement to his official report he wrote:

"... I wish to add a few remarks upon the difference between the two attacks, and also give some information which I have acquired. Had the enemy assaulted the work

on the first attack, he would have been beaten off with great slaughter. The fire of the fleet on that occasion, though very severe and formidable, was very diffuse and scattered, seemingly more designed to render a naval entrance secure than a land attack, consequently our defense was but slightly damaged. We had 19 guns bearing on the assault, and above all, the palisade was almost as good as new. Moreover, the fleet, during the first bombardment, hauled off at night, leaving the garrison time for rest, cooking, and refreshment. It is remarkable that during the first bombardment no gun's crew was ever driven from its guns: but on the 13th and 14th of January the fleet stationed itself with the definite object of destroying the land defense by direct and enfilade fire, the latter a *jeu d'enfilement* to knock down the traverses, destroying all guns, and pound the northeast salient into a practicable slope for the assaulting column. By 12 m. Sunday not a gun remained on the land front. The palisade was entirely shot away, the mines in advance, so deeply did the enemy's shot plough, were isolated from the wires and could not be used. Not a man could show his head in that infernal storm, and I could only keep a lookout in the safest position to inform me of the movements of the enemy. Contrary to previous practice, the fleet kept up the fire all night. Cooking was impracticable. The men, in the great part, in Fisher, at the second attack were not those of the first, and were much more demoralized. The casualties were greater, with but one ration for three days. Such was the condition when the parapets were manned on the enemy's ceasing fire for assault..."

The Union had chosen its objective correctly. With Fort Fisher fallen, Braxton Bragg decided that the remaining Cape Fear defenses could not be held. He ordered Fort Caswell blown up and the lesser fortifications evacuated. Wilmington soon fell to the Federals. As Welles, Grant, and the others had foreseen, this put the final seal of doom on the Confederacy. "Loss of the mouth of the Cape Fear River," writes Dr Freeman, "destroyed the last contact of the South with the outer world, except for the remote and undeveloped route through Mexican territory."

Most of the present day tenets of amphibious doctrine can be found, in at least rudimentary form, in the success and failures of the first and second attacks against Fort Fisher. Just as the Civil War was the first "modern" war, so were these operations the first "modern" amphibious landings. When we examine them, we see that practically everything that is known now—from amphibious reconnaissance to electrically controlled mine fields—was known then, although in a simpler form. In 1864 the best ordnance minds could not design an absolute weapon and the best engineers could not build a complete defense. The *Louisiana* powder ship failed and so did the walls of Fort Fisher. The picture has not changed greatly.

USMC

## In Brief

*The Joseph F. Ross, Jr., Safety Trophy* to be awarded annually to the Organized Marine Air Reserve fighter squadron with the best safety record for the calendar year in memory of the late 1st Lt Ross who died in an airplane crash last February 4 was recently presented to the Marine Corps by Mr and Mrs Joseph Ross, Sr. (Right) Gen Clifton B. Cates, Commandant, accepts the trophy for the Corps. Later it was turned over to BrigGen William O. Brice, heading the Marine Air Reserve Training Command at Glenview, Illinois. The trophy will be awarded on a point system, 100 points designating an accident-free year. Each flying accident will deduct a variable number of points depending upon the seriousness of the accident. In gold and silver the award is 22 inches high and weighs about 50 pounds.

*An artist's conception of the Marine Airlift 4-0-4*, a new combination twin-engine trainer, staff trans-



port, and utility cargo airplane. (Above) With characteristics, payload, and versatility comparable to those formerly assigned to four-engine aircraft, yet retaining the many advantages of twin-engine airplanes, the Airlift 4-0-4's basic mission will be to carry 15,000 pounds over a combat range of 1500 miles at 270 miles per hour.

*Newest anti-tank weapon*, a 105-mm recoilless rifle mounted on a jeep, is now under production the Army reports. "Unprecedented hitting power" for the infantry, the weapon is not yet in full production nor listed as standard equipment. However, it is expected to serve along side of the 3.5-inch bazooka to "provide the front line combat soldier



with the ability to knock out the most potent enemy tank known today." Another anti-tank gun, the M-27, was previously revealed by the Army as a single-shot, hand-loaded weapon with a range of nearly five miles and capable of firing 10 rounds per minute when handled by a trained crew.

*Two types of radiation "dog tags"* have been developed by Navy researchers which are supposed to fill requirements for the protection of personnel. Both types are simple, rugged, and inexpensive. In addition these "dosimeters," which measure the amount of radiation exposure the wearer has experienced, keep their sensitivity in storage and under extreme heat. One type uses salt crystals known as alkali halides, normally transparent but turning blue when exposed to gamma rays. Intensity of color determines amount of radiation. The other contains a silver-activated phosphate glass. Gamma rays convert the glass into a phosphor which takes on an orange color under ultraviolet light. As in the first, the intensity of color determines the seriousness of the radiation casualty.



*Entrance requirements for the Naval Academy* will be relaxed slightly to allow a greater percentage of applicants to enter on the strength of their secondary schooling alone it has been announced by the Navy. Effective now, both plane trigonometry and elementary physics will be eliminated from the pre-entry list of mandatory subjects required of applicants. However, it has been emphasized that no relaxation will be made in graduation standards.

*The Convair-Turboliner*, America's first turboprop transport, is shown during taxi tests at San Diego. This plane is a research model used to test turboprop engines in modern commercial-type aircraft. Two 2750-horsepowered Allison 501 turboprop engines are installed in this plane. It is a modified 40-passenger, twin-engine ship and now in wide use by both United States and foreign airlines. The Turboliner made its first flight December 29, 1950.

*Douglas's C-124A Globemaster II* recently made a successful take off carrying a gross weight of 194,500 pounds. This plane can carry a payload of nearly 50,000 pounds more than 2500 miles with adequate fuel reserves, it has been stated. Designed to carry troops, cargo, and heavy equipment the plane has large clamshell doors which open more than 11 feet in both height and width.



plies to all reservists except those employed on U. S. merchant vessels or American-owned ships under friendly foreign registry, or engaged in flying aircraft of commercial U. S. airlines.

*Foreign sailors are now being trained* in this country in elements of amphibious warfare under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Twenty French sailors are being schooled in the operation of small type landing craft at the Naval Amphib Base at Little Creek, Virginia. Under the tutelage of U. S. Navy petty officers, the Frenchmen include engineering and boat handling in their course. With French-speaking American sailors handling the interpreting, the training is running ahead of schedule by nearly 40 percent.

*With its hinged tailgate fully lowered*, the United States Air Force's new rescue Boat Mark I is ready to take a survivor aboard. The 40-foot twin engine craft was designed and built by the Navy. The tailgate enables rescue crews to bring injured airmen aboard and into the cabin without the usual rough handling caused by raising them over the sides. The boat is fully equipped for emergency medical treatment and has a complete sea-to-ground and sea-to-air radio communications system. Top speed is over 20 knots. Manned by a crew of five the boat can accommodate eight litter patients. Advance word on this craft was carried in last month's *In Brief*.



# 100 Best Books For A Military Education

By LtCol Robert B. McRae, USA

"Study fortifies the strong character, and enables it to decide and act correctly in critical moments in exact proportion as its possessor has previously studied the art that he is attempting to put into practice."<sup>1</sup>

ASK ANY LIBRARIAN IN OUR MILITARY SCHOOLS AND colleges what officers are reading today and he or she will invariably reply, "not much." Indeed, the librarian will go on to point out that aside from a few studious individuals the average officer seems to be interested only in the latest spectacular military novelty and the current book of the month.

The prevailing neglect of books, astounding in a most complex profession, may have its roots in a naive belief that the perfection of atomic weapons and guided missiles has made a study of the past meaningless. I am inclined to believe, however, that the problem is a deeper one. Perhaps the answer lies in the discovery some few years ago that true liberal education through the study and practice of the liberal arts and sciences was fast disappearing from the United States. Training of the professional man tended to be narrow and stereotyped. The military man, no exception to the trend, was at best a technician, not an artist.

So far as the professional man was concerned, the aim of education when liberal colleges were started in the United States was that every professional man should have a mind free enough and disciplined enough to recognize his professional ends and to understand the means which must be used to achieve them. As the catalogue of St Johns College in Annapolis put it, "In addition to the need for the universal distribution of critical intelligence, a minimal intellectuality was thought to be needed, which could distinguish between fact and fiction, between principle and case, between opinion and insight, between propaganda and instruction and between truth and falsity."<sup>2</sup> This degree of intellectual training is self evident, is absolutely necessary for the highest activities of men in democratic society, and we might add, professional military competence.

An antidote to the decline of liberal education has been applied chiefly through the efforts of Columbia and Chi-

<sup>1</sup>*Military History Applied to Modern Warfare*. By Capt J. W. E. Donaldson. Intro. Page XI. London, Hugh Rees, Ltd. 1907.

<sup>2</sup>Catalogue of St. Johns College in Annapolis—1938-1939, p. 20.



ago Universities and St Johns College at Annapolis, Maryland. These institutions issued a call for the rediscovery of the great classics of the Western World. In fact St Johns went so far as to mold its college curriculum around the "Great Books." The momentum of this rebirth of interest in Western liberal traditions has led to the widespread institution of "Honors Courses," "Great Books Seminars," "Adult Education Forums" and the like. Naturally as public enthusiasm arose reprints and new translations were forthcoming culminating in the

proposed 54 volume set to be issued by the Encyclopaedia Britannica, this year.

If the history of the "Great Books" movement is symptomatic of an equally low estate to which the study of military history and its allied subjects has fallen then the cure can perhaps be similar in nature. In other words, setting forth the problem, naming the neglected works, stimulating popular enthusiasm, forming "Honors Courses" or "Seminars" in the "Great Military Books" in the military colleges and whatever else is necessary to lead the officer to the books. All this, of course, will assist publishers in reprinting old works and making additional translations, a result much to be desired, since many of the most important are out of print.

A natural first step on our royal road to a military education is to persuade the officer that a lack of a broad liberal education in his art, or science if you will, is as disastrous to himself as the lack of a liberal education is to the citizenry at large. Let us proceed.

Many officers never stop to consider that the profes-

*Attention is invited to Marine Corps Memorandum 71-50, which contains the Marine Corps' recommended reading list of non-military publications.*

sion of arms is unique in that there is no other professional man who practices his profession so infrequently. Individually, we seldom have the opportunity to engage in combat with the enemy. Unlike the practicing doctor or lawyer, we military men must spend the years between conflicts gaining indirect experience or theoretical knowledge so that our infrequent direct exposure to combat will reflect credit upon ourselves and our profession.

A close study of military history teaches us many timeless things about the profession of arms. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the fact that the successful commander has almost invariably prepared himself for success by studious application to military history. This is not to say that study alone will make a successful commander. No one believes that study will turn an ordinary man into a genius, nor will it turn a man who is slow and vacillating by nature into an energetic and decisive character. But as the quotation at the beginning of this article points out, "Study does fortify the strong character."


We also learn from military history that there are several characteristics that successful commanders have in common. Most of these are easily gleaned from the books which appear in the list at the end of this article. Taken severally, these characteristics form what might be called "the profile of leadership." Many are inborn traits but several can be measurably enhanced by study of military history. Among those of this type are knowledge, willingness to accept responsibility, initiative, judgment, presence of mind and intelligence.

Today it is the fashion to adorn our Field Service Regulations with the nine principles of war, the twenty-five lessons of Pearl Harbor and similar capsized epigrams. I submit that for the average officer those principles are well nigh unintelligible so far as applicability to the garden variety military problem is concerned. Unless principles are studied in context with the events and circumstances of military history wherein they were discovered, and synthesized, they will never be clearly understood. To expect an officer to apply the principles without a background of knowledge regarding their origin is like asking a lawyer to prepare a case in Constitutional Law on a simple reading of the Constitution. It is the case and precedent that gives birth to principle and it is principle that illuminates case and precedent. Let us, therefore, study leadership in action as it is contained in the great military books which record these things.

The officer's quest for a sound military education cannot stop with a reading of the classics of military history, biography and strategy. He must also acquire a sound understanding of modern military technique. As a matter

*Because of the books listed in this article, our CHECK LIST is omitted this month. It will appear again next month.*





of fact Cyril Falls places this first, and perhaps rightly so when he says, "The first need of the soldier is to be able to fight, or to administer, or both, as occasion offers. The second is to find himself at home in the atmosphere of warfare, to have an understanding of war as a whole."<sup>28</sup>

Sound mastery of technique can be acquired through study of current Field Service Regulations and Field Manuals tempered by practical applicatory work in the doctrines enunciated therein. But even here the officer must keep his wits about him. MajGen J. F. C. Fuller has demonstrated time and again how sterile these publications can become unless they are continually revised by officers with a keen historical perspective, sound appreciation of the latest and immediately future developments in armament and an open mind to grasp the probable course of the next conflict.

Twentieth Century advances in science and the coming of the air age have broadened the horizon of the art of war to an almost fantastic degree. Officers worthy of the name must make a signal effort to acquire an understanding of these portents. We must now have a keen appreciation of the advances of science as they affect our profession or we will be grossly deficient in the practice of our art. Along with the scientific advances, the air age has made a restudy of geography of fundamental importance to the officer. If he will keep in front of him an azimuthal equidistant projection, or better still, a globe, while he absorbs the few outstanding books on global geography and geopolitics, it will come as no surprise to him when he is someday ordered to an advance base in Spitzbergen.

While it is the duty of the civil agencies of the government to set the foreign policy which military policy must serve it is also one of the missions of the Armed Forces as currently defined to "Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States." It takes little imagination to see that this requires the officer to perfect his understanding of domestic policies and foreign relations.

Preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of this nation is a first charge on the foreign policy of the United States. Indeed, Walter Lippmann calls the foreign policy "The Shield of the Republic." If this is so then the Armed Forces are certainly the "Sword" that strikes from that secure base. Together the sword and the shield must preserve the liberty of our nation and its citizens. The operation of both, however, is conditioned upon and reflects the current political be-

<sup>28</sup>*Military Art as an Academic Subject*. By Cyril Falls. Illustrated London News, 24 April 1948. Reprinted by Military Review, Jan 1949, p 85-87.

liefs of the nation. It therefore behooves the officer to study these things, for it is manifestly impossible for him to act efficiently as a guardian of the nation's safety unless he understands the basic tenets of the nation's political faith he is supposed to guard and advance.

Now all this sounds formidable and perhaps it is. Five years is not too short a time required for the pursuit of a liberal military education through books. This means 20 or more a year. Too much? I think not when it is compared with the professional competence gained. To do it though we must not fool ourselves. It means forgetting the current book of the month of the *Gone with the Wind* and *Forever Amber* type. I have always been persuaded that a study of the campaigns of Sherman is more profitable to the officer than the equivalent period spent investigating the sex life of the Southern belle, vintage 1860.

Before we plunge into the list of books let me say a few words about its contents.

Aside from a few books on geopolitics no regional or country studies will be found on the list. These are the province of specialized study at the appropriate time. When the officer is alerted for Japan for example, he can, and likely will, have his librarian select a short list of worthwhile books to prepare him for his tour. Among these he will find such books as Sir George Samson's *A Short Cultural History of Japan* and *Japan and the Western World*, and that excellent short study of Edwin Reischauer, *Japan Past and Present*.

Elimination of regional and country studies requires that we refrain from including books on the U.S.S.R. and Communism. For those who may be disappointed in the omission of such books I would suggest as a beginners' list the following; Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, Knopf 1947; the recently translated *Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.*, Macmillan 1949; Isaac Deutscher's *Stalin*, Oxford, 1949; D. F. White's *Growth of the Red Army*, Princeton 1943; Col Louis B. Ely's *The Red Army Today*, Military Service, 1949; and Gen Walter B. Smith's *My Three Years in Moscow*, Houghton-Mifflin 1949. Your librarian will be happy to furnish additional titles.

I have limited historical titles chiefly to those written on the *History of War*. This is unfortunate, and the officer would derive much profit from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*; Carlyle's *French Revolution*; Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico and Peru*, Turner's *The Frontier in American History* and others of like caliber. However, since the number must be limited and it is assumed that most college trained officers have already read several of these they have been omitted.

Technical treatises applying to a particular specialty have been omitted as the list is aimed at a general military education and such books are mastered by the concerned officer as his specialty indicates. For those interested in this type book two lists are recalled to mind. One for Ordnance officers is published in the *Ordnance*

Magazine for Jan-Feb 1950. The other for Quartermaster officers is in the *Quartermaster Review* of Sept-Oct 1947.

The number of comparatively recent books, mostly on World War II, in the list may be questioned as overly large. I am inclined to agree. My only excuse is that it is still too soon to expect good syntheses of lessons learned in that war. Accordingly more books had to be included to achieve a balanced picture than is the case of other periods of U. S. military history.

Politics and foreign policy were mentioned as essential studies. Despite this fact works on politics and political theory are conspicuous by their absence. I have assumed that the college trained officer has previously acquired the necessary background in these fields. For those who have not I recommend the great political treatises of the Western World supplemented by such books as Ogg's *Introduction to American Government*.<sup>4</sup> Foreign Policy is, I believe, adequately represented for a list of this type.

I must apologize for limiting books on the scientific field to two on atomic energy and one on all other aspects. Such a limitation, however, is not as fatal as might at first sight appear, for the lone book on this important field is *Scientists Against Time* by James P. Baxter. President Baxter's book, it will be remembered, is in essence a summary of the vast scientific effort of the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development and the book leads logically into the seven volume official history of OSRD entitled *Science in World War II*, Boston: Little-Brown, 1948. For those interested the latter work will amply repay the time spent in investigation of its riches.


Finally I may say that the list was not constructed without encountering differences of opinion from some of my colleagues with whom it was discussed. I can only hope that the number of additions or subtractions which the reader may care to make will constitute a small percentage of the total list. If that turns out to be the case, I will feel satisfied that the list is fairly representative. Now with appropriate fanfare let us draw back the curtain and gaze on these treasures.

#### 100 BEST BOOKS FOR A MILITARY EDUCATION

##### Air Warfare

1. The Command of the Air. By Giulio Douhet. New York: Coward, McCann, 1942. 394 p.
2. Bombing and Strategy. By Sir Gerald Dickens. London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1947. 90 p.

<sup>4</sup>A list of the "Great Classics" is available from the American Library Association under the title "Classics of the Western World."



3. Strategic Air Power. By Stefan T. Possony. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. 313 p.

##### Airborne Operations

4. Airborne Warfare. By Maj Gen James M. Gavin. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. 186 p.

##### Biography


5. A Greater Than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus. By B. H. Liddell Hart. London: Blackwood 1930.
6. The Generalship of U. S. Grant. By Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. London: John Murray, 1929. 444 p.
7. Stonewall Jackson. By Col G. F. R. Henderson. New York: Longmans, Green, 1949 (reprint). 737 p.
8. Napoleon as a General. By Count M. Yorck von Wartenburg. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1902. 2 v.
9. Sherman, Genius of the Civil War. By Liddell Hart. London: E. Benn, 1930.
10. Wellington. By Phillip Guedalla. New York: Harper, 1931. 536 p.
11. Allenby, A Study in Greatness. By Sir Archibald Wavell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. 312 p.

##### Geopolitics

12. Democratic Ideals and Reality. By Sir Halford MacKinder. New York: Holt, 1942. 219 p.
13. Geography and World Power. By James Fairgreive. New York: Dutton, 1917. 340 p.
14. Compass of the World. By Hans Weigert and others. New York: Macmillan, 1944. 460 p.
15. The Earth and the State. By Derwent S. Whittlesey. New York: Holt, 1944. 593 p.

##### History

16. The Fifteen Decisive Battles of History. By Edward S. Creasy. Harrisburg Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943. 434 p.
17. Decisive Battles, Their Influence upon History and Civilization. By Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Scribner, 1940. 1060 p.
18. Technics and Civilization. By Lewis Mumford. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934. 495 p.
19. Armament and History. By Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Scribner, 1945. 207 p.
20. History of the U. S. Army. By Col William A. Gance. New York: Appleton, 1942. 609 p.
21. History of the U. S. Navy. By Commodore Dudley Knox. New York: Putnam, 1948. 704 p.
22. Cannae. By Count Alfred von Schlieffen. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff School Press, 1931. 2 v.
23. The Place of War in History. By Cyril Falls. London: Oxford, 1947. 31 p.



24. *War and Peace (A Novel)*. By Leo Tolstoy. New York: Modern Library.

**B. Major Wars:**

**1. Prior to 1861**

25. *The History of Herodotus*. Trans. by George Rawlinson. New York: Tudor, 1928. 523 p.

26. *The Peloponnesian War*. By Thucydides. Trans. by R. Crawley. New York: Modern Library 1934. 516 p.

27. *History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*. By Sir Charles Oman. London: Methuen, 1924. 665 p.

28. *History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*. By Sir Charles Oman. New York: Dutton, 1937. 784 p.

29. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. By Capt A. T. Mahan. Boston: Little, Brown. 1897. 557 p.

**2. The American Civil War**

30. *Lincoln Finds a General*. By Kenneth Williams. New York: Macmillan, 1949. 2 v.

**3. 1917-1935**

31. *The American Army in France*. By Maj Gen James Harbord. Boston: Little Brown, 1935.

32. *Tannenburg, the First Thirty Days*. By Sir Edmund Ironside. London: Blackwood, 1933. 306 p.

**4. 1939-1945**

33. *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1939*. By G. M. Gathorne-Hardy. New York: Oxford University Press, 3d ed, 1942.

34. *The Gathering Storm*. By Winston Churchill. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1948. 667 p.

35. *The Battle of the Atlantic*. By Samuel E. Morison. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. 432 p.

36. *Okinawa, the Last Battle*. By the U. S. Army Historical Division. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947. 529 p.

37. *Operations in North African Waters*. By Samuel E. Morison. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. 297 p.

38. *The Struggle for Guadalcanal*. By Samuel E. Morison. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. 389 p.

39. *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions*. By Samuel E. Morison. Boston: Little, Brown, 1949. 296 p.

40. *Summary Reports, European and Pacific Wars*. By U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945, 1946.

41. *Campaigns of the Pacific (Naval)*. By U. S. Strategic

gic Bombing Survey. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. 389 p.

42. *Operation Victory*. By Maj Gen Sir Francis de Guingand. New York: Scribner's, 1947. 474 p.

43. *Normandy to the Baltic*. By Field Marshal Montgomery. New York: Dutton, 1946. 351 p.

44. *The Second World War*. By Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948. 431 p.

45. *Dark December*. By Robert Merriam. New York: Ziff-Davis, 1946. 234 p.

46. *Crusade in Europe*. By Gen Dwight Eisenhower. New York: Doubleday, 1948. 559 p.

47. *The War Reports of George C. Marshall, H. H. Arnold and Ernest J. King*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1947. 801 p.

48. *German Generals Talk*. By B. H. Liddell Hart. New York: Morrow, 1948. 308 p.

49. *War as I Knew It*. By Gen George S. Patton. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1947. 425 p.

50. *On Active Service in Peace and War*. By Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy. New York: Harper, 1948. 698 p.

51. *Their Finest Hour*. By Winston Churchill. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1948. 751 p.

52. *The Grand Alliance*. By Winston Churchill. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1950. 903 p.

53. *The Hinge of Fate*. By Winston Churchill. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1950.

54. *I Was There*. By Fleet Admiral Leahy. New York: Whittlesey, 1950.

55. *Hitler and His Admirals*. By Anthony Martiesssen. New York: Dutton, 1949. 275 p.

**Industrial and Scientific**

56. *American Industry in War*. By Bernard Baruch. New York: Prentice, Hall, 1941.

57. *Arsenal of Democracy*. By Donald M. Nelson. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946. 431 p.

58. *Scientists Against Time*. By James P. Baxter. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946. 450 p.

59. *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*. By Henry Smyth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. 266 p.

60. *Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. By the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. 43 p.

**Military Government**

61. *American Military Government*. By Hajo Holborn. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. 243 p.

**Naval Science**

62. *Naval Strategy*. By Capt A. T. Mahan. Boston: Little, Brown, 1919. 447 p.

63. A Guide to Naval Strategy. By Bernard Brodie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. 314 p.

#### Organization

64. National Security and the General Staff. By Maj Gen Otto Nelson. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 608 p.

65. America's Foreign Service. By R. Rives Childs. New York: Holt, 1947. 261 p.

#### Psychology and Sociology

66. Public Opinion and Propaganda. By Leonard Doob. New York: Holt, 1948. 600 p.

67. The Art of Leadership. By Ordway Teed. New York: Whittlesey, 1935. 308 p.

68. Psychological Warfare. By P. M. A. Linebarger. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. 259 p.

69. Men Against Fire. By S. L. A. Marshall. New York: Morrow, 1947. 215 p.

70. The American Soldier, Adjustment during Army Life. By S. S. Stouffer and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. 599 p.

71. The American Soldier, Combat and Its Aftermath. By S. A. Stouffer and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. 675 p.

72. The Red Badge of Courage (A Novel). By Stephen Crane. New York: Modern Library.

#### The Higher Study of War<sup>5</sup>

##### A. National Policy and Planning

73. American Strategy in World Politics. By N. J. Spykman. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942. 504 p.

74. Military Policy of the United States. By Maj Gen Emory Upton. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907. 405 p.

75. America in Arms. By Brig Gen John M. Palmer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. 297 p.

76. Bases Overseas. By George Weller. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. 434 p.

77. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. By Sherman Kent. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. 226 p.

78. Post War Foreign Policy Preparation. By the Department of State. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950.

79. Diplomatic History of the United States. By Samuel F. Bemis. New York: Holt, 1950 (revised).

80. The Charter of the United Nations. By Leland

<sup>5</sup>Librarians may quarrel with many titles for this field. I must say, however, that I have never found a particularly satisfying method of separating national policy from strategy or strategy from tactics. I have, therefore, adopted the term "The Higher Study of War" as a generic term to describe the more lofty pursuits of the Art of War. Under this catch-all phrase I have listed three main subdivisions, viz., "National Policy and Planning," "Principles of War," and "Tactics."

Goodrich and Edward Hambro. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949. 710 p.

81. The Atlantic Pact. By Halford L. Hoskins. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949. 104 p.

82. U. S. Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943. 177 p.

83. The Valor of Ignorance. By Homer Lea. New York: Harper, 1942. 343 p.

84. The Army of the Future. By Gen Charles de Gaulle. New York: Lippincott, 1941. 179 p.

85. Overture to Overlord. By LtGen Sir Frederick Morgan. New York: Doubleday, 1950. 302 pages.

86. Imperial Defense: The Trench-Gascoigne Prize Essay of 1946. By Sqdn Ldr S. L. Swain. London: Royal United Service Institutions Journal, May 1947.

##### B. Principles of War

87. On War. By Karl von Clausewitz. New York: Modern Library, 1943. 641 p.

88. The Principles of War. By Marshal Foch. London: Chapman, Hall, 1918. 351 p.

89. Foundation of the Science of War. By Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. London: Hutcheson, 1925.

90. Makers of Modern Strategy. By Edward M. Earle and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943. 553 p.

91. Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War. Edited by J. D. Hittle. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1947. 161 p.

92. Generals and Generalship. By Sir Archibald Wavell. New York: Macmillan, 1941.

93. War in Three Dimensions. By Air Vice Admiral E. J. Kingston-McCloughny. London: Jonathan Cape, 1949. 159 p.

94. The Revolution in Warfare. By B. H. Liddell Hart. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. 125 p.

##### C. Strategy and Tactics

95. Defense. By Gen Wilhelm von Leeb. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943. 159 p.

96. Surprise. By General Waldemar Erfurth. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943. 200 p.

97. Battle Studies. By Col Ardent du Picq. New York: Macmillan, 1921. 273 p.

98. Armored Warfare. By Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943. 189 p.

99. The Conduct of War. By Lt Gen C. F. Von der Goltz. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1908. 285 p.

100. Roots of Strategy. Edited by Thomas R. Phillips. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1940. 448 p.

# Passing in Review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

### Southern Morale . . .

THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 1861-1865. By E. Merton Coulter. 644 pages. Indexed and illustrated. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. \$7.00

Of all the reasons given for the loss (or winning) of the Civil War, the one least likely to please the sentimentalists is that the South lacked sufficient morale to win. Yet this is the conclusion reached by E. Merton Coulter, distinguished professor of history at the University of Georgia. He builds a strong case for his theory in a book which knocks over a good many magnolia-scented conceptions fostered by nostalgic old women of both sexes.

At the outbreak of the war, the North had three times the South's area, four times the white population, and twice the real and personal wealth. The South had only one-tenth the nation's industrial investment, one-quarter the banking capital, and 9,800 miles of railroad to the North's 19,000. Nevertheless, the author contends the South had enough of everything it needed if only its will to win had exceeded the North's determination to maintain the Union. Southern morale was certainly high enough in the beginning, when extremists confidently told each other that "one pure, high-toned Southern gentleman . . . is worth more than the entire twenty millions of Yankees." Prof Coulter tracks down the destruction of this spirit between then and 1865.

His book is volume seven (seventh in sequence, but actually the fourth to reach print) of the ten-volume *A History of the South*. In 1914, Maj George W. Littlefield, CSA, established a fund for "the full and impartial study of the South and its part in American history." The project is now under the joint sponsorship of the University of Texas and Louisiana State University. Prof Coulter is the present editor of the series as well as author of the two volumes concerning the Civil War and the Reconstruction.

These are the factors which did the most, in his opinion, to collapse Confederate morale:

(1) An unwise financial policy; (2) poorly integrated rail system; (3) contentions and dissensions between the states, and between the states and the Confederacy; (4) unpopularity of Jefferson Davis; (5) an irresponsible

press, which spread rumors "both tonic and poison" to morale.

Militarily, the Confederacy's greatest shortcoming was its failure to evolve a master strategy. The South was forced into a defensive dispersal of effort rather than an offensive concentration by three major factors: First, the underlying doctrine of state rights gave each governor a large say in the employment of his state's troops. Second, the South's foreign policy was based on the premise of a defensive war. Third, the North's Anaconda strategy of attacking on all sides forced the South to defend on all fronts. Lee was perhaps the only general in the South who might have solved this strategic problem and he either could not or would not be diverted from his beloved Army of Northern Virginia. Antietam and Gettysburg, the only two significant incursions into Northern territory, involved only a fraction of the Confederacy's potential offensive strength.


As late as early 1865, Confederate leaders were talking of a spring campaign in which 500,000 troops could be put in the field if only the soldiers would come back to their armies. But the will to fight was no longer there. To too many it had become "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight."

Reviewed by Maj E. H. Simmons

### Recommended Reading

The Blue and The Gray		
Edited by Henry Steele Commager (2 volumes)	\$12.00	
Defence of the West	B. H. Liddell Hart	4.00
Infantry Brigadier MajGen Sir Howard Kippenberger		4.75
Rommel	Desmond Young	3.50
War and Human Progress	John U. Neff	6.50
Sword and Pen	MajGen A. C. Duff	2.00
MacArthur: Man Of Action		
Frank Kelly and Cornelius Ryan	2.00	
This Is Russia—Uncensored	Edmund Stevens	2.75

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
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# How Would You Do It?



**By 2d Lt Charles R. Stiles**

RECENTLY, WHILE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I WAS detailed to escort some 200 cadets on a tour of U. S. Fleet units visiting one of the countries. The cadets were senior classmen from the country's Army Military Academy, their equivalent to our West Point.

All arrangements for the tour had been made and I received a dispatch designating the time and place to meet the cadets and their schedule for the day. Prior to departing for the academy I was introduced to a retired foreign army captain who was to act as my interpreter. On our arrival, I noticed a formation on the school's small parade ground. One look and I could see there were more than 200 cadets. I desperately hoped that it was part of the daily routine and not something involving me.

At this point my interpreter began rattling in his native tongue, directing me toward the formation. As we approached, a loud command echoed across the parade ground and every figure froze to attention. From the right flank of the formation stepped an elderly and stately personage. I knew he was of high rank from his formal military appearance and demeanor. He stopped short, clicked his heels, saluted and greeted me in his own language. I returned his salute and turned to my interpreter who introduced me to my host; he was the Colonel Commandant of the Academy. A few more words were passed and my interpreter informed me the Colonel had invited me to inspect the Academy's staff.

WHAT SHOULD I DO? Inspect a group of officers who were certainly of higher rank than I or offer some lame excuse that time was short and we should get under way? How should I go about inspecting such a staff? Had they expected a higher ranking American officer? Would they be officially insulted that a mere second lieutenant had been sent as escort? Yet they surely knew my rank and it might embarrass all concerned if I failed to make an inspection.

I decided to accept the Colonel's offer and we started down the line. I was saluted by each officer individually and introduced by the interpreter. As I had previously surmised, the officers of the staff outranked me in about every case.

Having run the gauntlet of the staff, I was taken to the front and center of the cadet formation. Here a cadet, obviously a first classman, greeted me and through my interpreter I was invited to inspect the corps of cadets. Somewhat bemused, I accepted and made a rapid inspection, keeping my fingers crossed.

The inspection over, I finally arranged for the departure of the 200 cadets. At this point I received another jolt in my protocol. I learned that the Colonel Commandant was joining the tour. I knew that no one in the Fleet was aware of this fact and that none of the ships would be prepared to receive a visitor of his rank. We couldn't be caught flat-footed after the welcome I had received.

At our first stop, disregarding traditions of the United States Navy, I asked the Colonel to wait until I went aboard to check the preparations for receiving visitors. Here my luck changed. The ship's staff duty officer happened to be on the quarterdeck and I hastily filled him in on the situation. He called the Captain of the ship, ordered the OD to call up the sideboys, and told me to bring the Colonel aboard. The Colonel Commandant was piped aboard with all due honors, was received by the ship's captain, and I breathed a little easier.

That was the last I saw of the Colonel. After touring several other ships, the cadets were returned to the academy.

I have on occasion related this story to a few of my friends. Their response has been varied. Some challenge the validity of my story. Others claim I should have done this or that. Still others believed I was entirely correct in my actions. All I can say, it was a rare experience for a second lieutenant. What would you have done? USMC



## The Anabasis In Northeast Korea\*

By C. W. Dressler

THE RETREAT of the Ten Thousand, described in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, is a story of heroism which has been read for nearly 2,500 years. That epic of ancient times is being duplicated at the present moment in North Korea, where some 20,000 men of the Seventh Infantry and the First Marines are fighting their way through enemy-infested hills to the sea and safety.

These American warriors were trapped near the Changjin Reservoir in Northeast Korea by the invasion of hordes of Chinese troops. They have already suffered thousands of casualties. Planes, landing on an improvised airstrip at Hagaru, have taken off the wounded and the dead. For the main body, however, there is no alternative but to fight their way through the snow-clad mountains to Hungnam, where an evacuation by sea may be possible.

There are many similarities between our men in Northeast Korea, and Xenophon's famous Ten Thousand. Perhaps it will not be amiss to point some of them out.

LIKE THIS SMALL but indomitable force of Americans in Korea, the Greek Ten Thousand were surrounded by innumerable hordes of enemies. They had gone into Persia with Cyrus, whose death left them leaderless. They were on their own in the middle of a hostile country, far from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked by high mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, and without cavalry to guard their retreat.

Yet, to a demand for surrender, a young Athenian retorted: "If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them." Arms and valor, he said, were all that remained, and they would not give them up. This attitude so impressed the Persian military commander that he resolved to use treachery instead of force. Pretending friendship, he led the Greeks part of the way, and then

tricked and captured their commanders. It was then that the young Xenophon took command, and led that famous march about which men still read, in the words in which the military historian described it.

REFUSING TO TREAT with the treacherous general of Artaxerxes, the Greek Ten Thousand started out, harassed by hosts of archers in the rear—archers who refused to come to close quarters with these hardy fighting men. They crossed plains, forded rivers, and climbed mountains. At times their route was covered with snow to the depth of six feet, and the wind was so piercing that they stopped to offer sacrifices to Boreas. Many suffered from snow-blindness; others from frozen feet. Sometimes they were tempted to quit, and lie where they fell. But they drove on, almost always fighting. When the Persians quit following them, hostile tribes stood in front to bar the mountain passes or the river fords.

The story is too long to tell here, but it is well worth reading. The time came when the soldiers in the vanguard, topping a high mountain, cried: "Thalatta! Thalatta!" (The Sea! The Sea!). There were still mountains and plains to cross, and fighting to be done before they reached it. But Xenophon said: "Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us from reaching the point at which we have so long been aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so." And so they found their way home at last.

Another such tale is being written in blood on the snow of Northeast Korea. There is nothing we at home can do but pray that, at last, our Twenty Thousand will conquer all the odds of ground and weather and enemies and come through safe to the sea. "We will make it," said one regimental commander, "somehow." US MC

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